Kaufman v. CDCR

Background

Joel David Kaufman, a California parolee proceeding without a lawyer, filed a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court screened his amended complaint under the statute governing preliminary review of prisoner civil-rights cases. The court stated that it had to identify claims that could proceed and dismiss claims that were frivolous, malicious, inadequately pleaded, or sought damages from an immune defendant.

Kaufman sued parole agent Kathy A. Miley, Acosta, whom the opinion describes as a clinician in a state-contracted mental-health program, and Pacific Forensic Psychology Associates, Inc., which the opinion describes as the entity running that program. His claims concerned reports about his social-media use, emails, and an accusation of stalking; mandatory drug testing; a social-media restriction; permission to attend a probate-court hearing and visit his father; alleged interference with an inheritance; negligence; and alleged indifference to parole regulations.

Rulings on the Claims

The court held that the allegations about Miley’s and Acosta’s reports to the parole board did not state a due-process claim. The opinion also dismissed a claim for compensatory damages based on embarrassment from mandatory urinalysis because the Prison Litigation Reform Act bars damages for mental or emotional distress without physical injury.

The court found Kaufman’s claim that Miley denied permission to travel to a probate-court hearing, and did not respond to communications from his attorney, cognizable when liberally construed. The court dismissed the alleged conspiracy to deprive Kaufman of an inheritance because civil fraud is a state-law tort and federal wire-fraud law does not provide a private civil cause of action for another individual’s alleged commission of that crime.

The court dismissed the challenge to mandatory drug testing, stating that drug testing of parolees is constitutional. It found the challenge to the parole condition prohibiting social-media use cognizable when liberally construed. The opinion’s discussion of the sixth claim is incomplete in the provided text, but the conclusion states that the sixth claim is cognizable. The opinion describes the seventh claim as negligence under state tort law and the eighth claim as an alleged violation of parole regulations; it states that those claims are not actionable under § 1983.

Disposition and Next Steps

The order’s conclusion states: “Plaintiff’s fourth claim, part of his fifth claim,” and his sixth claim are cognizable when liberally construed, while all other claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim. The order directs that Defendant Miley be served through the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s electronic-service process. It also requires the remaining defendant or defendants to file an answer and, generally, a summary-judgment or other dispositive motion within the stated deadlines, and permits discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

There is an internal inconsistency concerning the fourth claim. In the body of the opinion, the court says the fourth claim “must be dismissed,” but the conclusion lists the fourth claim as cognizable. The provided text also appears to omit part of the analysis of the sixth claim. The summary therefore reports both statements rather than resolving the conflict.