Lopez v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.
- Richard Seeborg
- 3:19-cv-01954
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 2
In Lopez v. Experian, Chief Judge Seeborg denied plaintiffs’ request to seek reconsideration of partial summary judgment based on a later CFPB rule.
The plaintiffs and Experian Information Solutions, Inc.; the plaintiffs could not seek reconsideration of the earlier partial summary judgment order based on the CFPB rule.
What happened
In Lopez v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., the plaintiffs asked for permission to seek reconsideration of an earlier order that granted Experian partial summary judgment. They relied on a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau interpretive rule issued in July 2022 concerning the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s permissible-purpose clause.
The court denied the request. It found that the plaintiffs waited about two months after the rule’s publication without explaining the delay, and that they had not shown the extraordinary circumstances required for reconsideration. The court also granted the plaintiffs’ administrative motion to file two documents under seal.
Chief Judge Richard Seeborg ruled that the plaintiffs had not shown newly discovered evidence, clear error, or a controlling change in law. The plaintiffs acknowledged that the Bureau’s rule was persuasive rather than controlling authority, so the court denied leave to file the reconsideration motion.
The detailed version
- Lopez v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. · No. 3:19-cv-01954
- Richard Seeborg
- Nov. 17, 2022
Background
The plaintiffs sought leave—meaning permission—to file a motion asking the court to reconsider its May 18, 2022 order. That earlier order granted Experian Information Solutions, Inc. partial summary judgment. The plaintiffs focused on claims concerning whether Experian had a legally permissible purpose for its conduct before May 2018.
The request relied on an interpretive rule issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in July 2022 concerning the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s “permissible purpose clause.” The plaintiffs argued that the rule meant summary judgment should not have been granted to Experian on those pre-May 2018 claims.
Court’s Analysis
The court denied leave to file the reconsideration motion for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs did not explain why they waited roughly two months after the Bureau published its rule before seeking reconsideration. The court concluded that this delay did not support a finding that they acted with reasonable diligence.
Second, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not made the required showing under the court’s local rule. That rule permits a party to seek reconsideration based on new material facts or a change in law after the earlier order. The court also noted that Ninth Circuit precedent generally requires newly discovered evidence, clear error, or an intervening change in controlling law, except in highly unusual circumstances. The plaintiffs conceded that the Bureau’s rule was persuasive authority rather than controlling law.
Disposition
Chief United States District Judge Richard Seeborg denied the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration. The order did not alter the earlier partial summary judgment ruling. The court separately granted the plaintiffs’ administrative motion to file two documents under seal.
Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.