Faulkner v. Lucille Packard Salter Children's Hospital

Background

Bethan Faulkner worked at Lucile Packard Salter Children’s Hospital at Stanford and became the patient care manager of the neonatal intensive care unit. She reported problems including staffing shortages, a lack of break nurses, facility issues, and pests, and submitted written complaints through the hospital’s internal complaint system. She also described workplace conflict and stress.

The hospital placed Faulkner on a performance improvement plan in August 2020. On November 10, 2020, hospital supervisors decided to terminate her. Faulkner then contacted the hospital’s third-party leave administrator at about 4:00 p.m. to request three weeks of medical leave. She testified that she had not told anyone at the hospital that she intended to request medical leave before that call. The hospital terminated her on November 11, 2020.

Faulkner’s amended complaint asserted six claims: interference with rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA); FMLA retaliation; disability discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); FEHA retaliation; wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; and retaliation for medical whistleblowing under California Health and Safety Code section 1278.5.

FMLA claims

The hospital moved for partial summary judgment on the FMLA interference and retaliation claims, Claims One and Two. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The court held that the undisputed timeline defeated these claims. A worker seeking FMLA leave must give the employer enough notice that the worker needs qualifying leave, including the expected timing and duration. The evidence showed that supervisors decided to terminate Faulkner at 1:20 p.m. on November 10, several hours before she contacted the leave administrator. Faulkner testified that she had not told anyone at the hospital about her intent to take medical leave before contacting the administrator. The court concluded that Faulkner had not presented specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial and granted defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on the FMLA claims (Claims One and Two).

The court also stated that Faulkner appeared to have abandoned additional FMLA theories concerning a reduced work schedule and retaliation for taking FMLA leave or opposing the hospital’s leave practices because she did not support those theories in her opposition brief.

FEHA claims

The hospital also sought summary judgment on Faulkner’s FEHA disability-discrimination and retaliation claims, Claims Three and Four. The court ruled that these claims failed for two reasons.

First, as with the FMLA claims, Faulkner did not present evidence showing that the termination decision was made after she requested medical leave. Second, the court held that the evidence did not show a disability protected by FEHA. Faulkner characterized her condition as work-related stress, anxiety, and related physical symptoms. The court concluded that the stress she described, which stemmed from workplace conditions and performance-related interactions, was not a cognizable disability under FEHA. The court therefore granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the FEHA claims (Claims Three and Four).

Motion to amend the answer

The hospital separately sought permission under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 to amend its answer to add a “Same Decision” affirmative defense. That defense asserted that legitimate, nondiscriminatory performance-based reasons would have led the hospital to make the same termination decision even if discriminatory reasons had also played a role.

The court found no undue prejudice, bad faith, or other reason to deny the amendment. It noted that the proposed defense added a legal theory rather than a new factual theory and that the hospital did not seek to change the trial schedule. The court granted defendant’s motion to amend the answer and directed the hospital to file the amended answer by December 2, 2022.

The court also allowed Faulkner to conduct limited discovery about the added defense, including a deposition of a defense witness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), at the hospital’s expense. The opinion states that Faulkner was not required to take that deposition.

Disposition

The court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Claims One through Four and granted defendant’s motion to amend the answer to add the affirmative defense of Same Decision. Claims Five and Six were identified as the two remaining claims. The court declined to issue an advisory ruling at that stage on whether attorney’s fees could be recovered under California Health and Safety Code section 1278.5.