Duron v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

Background

Ralph Duron sued United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS). His claims arose from events involving a school lockdown, his resulting post-traumatic stress disorder, requested leave and workplace accommodations, complaints to UPS personnel, his suspension, and his termination. The opinion states that UPS fired Duron chiefly for dishonesty and time theft. Under the applicable collective bargaining agreements, those were classified as cardinal infractions for which UPS could fire an employee for a first offense.

Duron brought claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), and sections 98.6, 1102.5, and 6310 of the California Labor Code. He also brought derivative claims for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation under the FEHA and for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. He sought punitive damages.

The court’s analysis

The court granted UPS summary judgment on Counts 2, 3, 9, and 11. Those counts alleged failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive process under the FEHA, as well as interference with rights under the FMLA and CFRA. The court found that undisputed evidence showed Duron was promptly given each accommodation he requested and that UPS diligently engaged in the interactive process, including taking him to a doctor immediately when he requested it. The court concluded that these claims failed as a matter of law.

The court also concluded that Duron’s punitive-damages claim failed as a matter of law. It stated that no reasonable jury could find, under the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, that anyone at UPS acted with the fraud, oppression, or malice required for punitive damages under California law.

The court denied summary judgment on Duron’s core discrimination and retaliation claims under the FEHA, FMLA, CFRA, and the identified Labor Code provisions, as well as his derivative failure-to-prevent and wrongful-termination claims. Those claims were Counts 1, 4–8, 10, 12, and 13. Although the court described Duron’s evidence as thin, it found enough to create a genuine dispute of material fact—a dispute that a jury could resolve.

Among other evidence, Duron testified that he went to human resources with discrimination and retaliation concerns on June 28, 2019, the day before his suspension, and that human resources declined to give him the whistleblower-hotline number. The court stated that the close timing between protected activity and an adverse employment action could support an inference of retaliation.

The court also found evidence from which a jury could question whether UPS’s stated reasons for terminating Duron were pretexts, meaning explanations that concealed an unlawful motive. Duron had sent messages describing his movements and stating that he was waiting for a response instead of delivering packages. The court reasoned that this conduct could appear inconsistent with an intent to be dishonest and steal time. A jury could therefore find that UPS used those reasons to terminate him immediately without progressive discipline. The court acknowledged that gross insubordination was also a cardinal infraction and could support a different interpretation, but said that interpretation was not compelled by the evidence.

The opinion also discussed testimony and interview notes describing comments by supervisors about the area where the lockdown occurred, the seriousness of the danger, Duron’s claimed mental injury, and the authenticity of a doctor’s note. Because testimony indicated that the supervisors were collectively involved in the termination decision, the court found that a jury could infer discriminatory intent. It further found that a jury could conclude the supervisors granted leave and accommodations to comply with the law but later retaliated when an opportunity arose to terminate Duron.

UPS argued that Duron’s claims were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The court rejected that argument, explaining that the claims depended on rights created by federal statutes rather than rights created by the collective bargaining agreements, and that resolving the claims did not substantially depend on interpreting those agreements.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part UPS’s motion for summary judgment. UPS was entitled to summary judgment on Counts 2, 3, 9, and 11 and on Duron’s punitive-damages claim. The court denied summary judgment on Counts 1, 4–8, 10, 12, and 13, leaving those claims for further proceedings.