Khan v. Payton

Background

Muhammad Khan, a state prisoner, filed this action without a lawyer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims for violations of federal rights by people acting under state authority. The complaint named correctional officer M. Payton and concerned events at San Quentin State Prison’s Reception Center. The court had previously dismissed Khan’s first amended complaint with leave to amend so he could try to state an equal-protection claim.

Screening of the Second Amended Complaint

Because Khan is a prisoner suing a governmental officer, the court screened the second amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That law requires the court to identify claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek money from an immune defendant. The court also said that filings by people without lawyers must be read liberally.

The court found that the second amended complaint did not state sufficient facts. It listed causes of action and repeatedly said that Khan “realleges and incorporates by reference” earlier paragraphs, but those paragraphs were not included in the second amended complaint. The court said the pleading appeared to be a revision of only the last pages of the first amended complaint. It also noted that Khan had crossed out the equal-protection claim and a California Government Code § 19572 claim, even though the latter had previously been dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Khan also included a Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, although the court had previously dismissed that claim for damages with prejudice.

Ruling

The court ordered Khan to file a third and final amended complaint within 28 days, using the court’s form and providing a complete factual statement supporting each claim. The new complaint would replace all earlier complaints, and claims or defendants omitted from it would no longer be part of the case.

Alternatively, Khan could notify the court that he wanted to proceed only on the claims the court had identified as cognizable in the first amended complaint: a First Amendment claim concerning denial of religious freedom, an Eighth Amendment claim concerning denial of food, a due-process claim, and state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence by San Quentin State Prison. The court would then treat the first amended complaint as the operative complaint and strike the second amended complaint. The order warned that failure to respond as directed would result in dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim. Judge Beth Labson Freeman did not decide the ultimate merits of the underlying claims in this screening order.