Droesch v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Background

Denise Droesch and other plaintiffs brought a wage-and-hour collective and class action against their current or former employer, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. The plaintiffs were telephone-based employees who alleged that Wells Fargo failed to pay them for all time worked. Their claims arose under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which requires overtime pay for qualifying work over 40 hours in a workweek, and under state wage laws.

The employees had to boot up their computers, open telephone software called Softphone or ACES, and become ready to receive calls. At the end of the day, they logged off the telephone software and shut down their computers. Wells Fargo’s written policies required non-exempt employees to record all time worked, including time spent using electronic devices for business purposes. Harrison and Thompson nevertheless presented evidence that supervisors told them their time entries should match the time they were logged into the telephone system, and that supervisors knew or should have known that they sometimes worked before or after that logged-in period without recording the time.

Issues and Analysis

Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment, a ruling that claims cannot proceed to trial because the evidence presents no legally significant factual dispute. It argued that the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims failed because Wells Fargo lacked knowledge of off-the-clock work and because any unpaid time was too minimal to be compensable.

The court denied summary judgment on Harrison’s and Thompson’s FLSA claims based on Wells Fargo’s alleged lack of knowledge. Viewing the evidence in the plaintiffs’ favor, a factfinder could conclude that supervisors gave instructions inconsistent with the written timekeeping policy and were aware, or should have been aware, of unpaid work.

The court also denied summary judgment under the de minimis doctrine, which can prevent recovery for otherwise compensable work that is too minor to record administratively. Wells Fargo had the burden of proving that the doctrine applied. The court found disputes about the practical difficulty of recording the time, the total amount of potentially compensable time, and how regularly the work occurred. The court also rejected Wells Fargo’s argument that declarations from Thompson and Harrison improperly contradicted their deposition testimony under the sham-affidavit rule.

The court granted summary judgment on Goins’s FLSA claim. Goins was on medical leave during part of the relevant period and, after returning, attended training during which she did not have computer access or answer customer calls. The plaintiffs did not dispute that she did not perform the call-center work at issue, and Goins’s uncertainty about whether she had been paid for several days of training was not enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that she was not paid.

The court denied summary judgment on Harrison’s and Thompson’s state wage-and-hour claims because it denied summary judgment on their FLSA claims for the same reasons. Harrison conceded that her unfair-competition-law claim had to be dismissed without prejudice because she had an adequate remedy under other laws. The court also held that Goins’s Arizona state-law claim was barred by Arizona’s one-year statute of limitations and that the California pandemic-related tolling rule did not apply to extend that Arizona-law claim.

Disposition

Judge Corley granted Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. The motion was granted as to Goins’s claims and otherwise denied. Harrison’s unfair-competition-law claim was dismissed without prejudice. The court also set a further case-management conference for February 2, 2023.