Johnson v. City of San Jose
- Beth Freeman
- 5:21-cv-01849
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 16
In Johnson v. City of San Jose, Judge Freeman denied defendants’ motion to dismiss First Amendment and municipal-liability claims under Section 1983.
Kyle Johnson’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Officer James Adgar and his Section 1983 municipal-liability claims against the City of San Jose were allowed to proceed; the motion did not resolve the ultimate merits of those claims.
What happened
In Johnson v. City of San Jose, Kyle Johnson alleged that San Jose police Officer James Adgar shot him with a foam projectile while Johnson was leaving a May 30, 2020 protest. Johnson said the projectile seriously injured his leg and that he had not heard a dispersal order before being hit.
The defendants asked the court to dismiss Johnson’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Officer Adgar and his Section 1983 claims against the City. Johnson argued that the allegations plausibly showed that police used force to deter protesters and that the City’s policies, training, supervision, and response supported its responsibility for the alleged constitutional violations.
The court denied the motion. It ruled that Johnson had alleged enough facts for the First Amendment claim against Officer Adgar and for the municipal-liability claims against the City to proceed. Judge Beth Labson Freeman did not decide whether Johnson will ultimately prove those claims.
The detailed version
- Johnson v. City of San Jose · No. 5:21-cv-01849
- Beth Freeman
- Dec. 12, 2022
Background
Kyle Johnson alleged that Officer James Adgar of the San Jose Police Department fired a 40mm foam baton projectile at him during protests in San Jose on May 30, 2020. Johnson alleged that he was attempting to flee from police when Adgar intentionally fired at him from behind, without first giving him a dispersal order or warning. The projectile struck Johnson’s leg, causing severe bruising, a blood clot, continuing clotting problems, reduced mobility, pain, and emotional distress.
Johnson also alleged that San Jose police used projectiles, tear gas, batons, and other force against protesters during several days of demonstrations. He claimed the City had authorized or permitted crowd-control practices such as “kettling,” had changed its policy shortly before the protests to allow 40mm projectile weapons in crowd-control situations, and had provided inadequate training on the lawful use of those weapons. He further alleged that the City knew about officers’ conduct during the protests, replenished its supply of less-lethal weapons, and failed to change the officers’ behavior or discipline at least one officer.
Claims and motion
Johnson’s Second Amended Complaint asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Adgar and the City. One claim alleged that Adgar used force in retaliation for Johnson’s protected protest activity, violating the First Amendment. The claims against the City relied on municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, which can make a municipality responsible for constitutional violations caused by an official policy, widespread custom, inadequate training or supervision, or ratification by a final policymaker. Johnson also asserted claims for battery, negligence, and violations of the California Bane Act, but those claims were not the subject of this motion.
The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally sufficient claim. The court generally accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true at this stage and views them in the plaintiff’s favor.
Court’s analysis
For the First Amendment retaliation claim, the court explained that Johnson had to allege protected activity, conduct by Adgar that could deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing that activity, and facts suggesting that the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in Adgar’s conduct. The court found that Johnson’s allegations about Adgar firing at him as he fled, together with the alleged widespread use of force against mostly peaceful protesters, plausibly supported an inference that the police response was intended in part to intimidate protesters and deter their speech. The court therefore denied Adgar’s motion to dismiss that claim.
For the claims against the City, the court found that Johnson plausibly alleged an unconstitutional custom or practice based on the alleged repeated use of force during the protests and the alleged failure to reprimand at least one officer. The court declined to dismiss that theory merely because the alleged incidents occurred during a short period.
The court also found sufficient allegations of deliberate indifference for Johnson’s failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise theories. Johnson alleged that the City changed its policy one week before the protests to permit use of less-lethal weapons for crowd control, without providing training on the legally permissible uses of those weapons in that setting for at least five years. He also alleged that the police department knew about officers’ conduct during the protests and failed to direct them to change course.
Finally, the court concluded that the alleged organized, department-wide response to the protests supported an inference that the police department ratified its officers’ actions. The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Monell claims against the City.
Disposition
The court denied the partial motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. This ruling allowed the challenged claims against Officer Adgar and the City to proceed; it did not decide whether Johnson will prevail on those claims. The opinion was signed by Judge Beth Labson Freeman.
Read the full 16-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.