Mendoza v. Koenig

Background

Roberto Francisco Mendoza, who was incarcerated at the Correctional Training Facility, filed this self-represented petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal statute allowing a state prisoner to seek federal review of custody that allegedly violates federal law. He challenged events following his state conviction and resentencing.

Mendoza had been convicted in Monterey County Superior Court of 11 counts involving lewd or lascivious acts on children under 14 and had received a sentence of 45 years to life plus 18 years. In an earlier federal proceeding, the court denied relief on Counts 1 through 5 but vacated the convictions on Counts 6 through 11 and directed California either to restart proceedings on those charges or seek resentencing.

After criminal proceedings were restarted, Mendoza said the prosecutor added and increased charges in retaliation, which he characterized as vindictive prosecution. He pleaded guilty to 17 counts and received a total sentence of 40 years. His plea agreement also stated that he waived state and federal writs and appeals and agreed not to file future collateral attacks on his conviction or sentence.

Mendoza later pursued state post-conviction relief, but the Monterey County Superior Court found that he had waived the relevant claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. The California appellate and supreme courts denied his petitions without explanation. The Ninth Circuit transferred Mendoza’s federal petition to the district court after determining that authorization for a second or successive petition was unnecessary because Mendoza had not previously challenged this resentencing in federal court.

Claim 1: Challenge based on later California law

Mendoza argued that California Penal Code § 1016.8 made his plea agreement unconstitutional, invalid, and contrary to public policy. The court had dismissed this claim during initial screening because it relied on state law rather than federal law. Mendoza implicitly sought reconsideration of that decision.

The court denied reconsideration. It explained that § 1016.8’s references to federal law supplied background principles about knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty pleas, but that the statute’s rule invalidating certain waivers of future legal benefits was a California policy decision. Because the claim depended on the meaning and effect of state law, the court held that it was not a claim that could support federal review under § 2254.

Claim 2: Vindictive prosecution

Mendoza’s second claim alleged vindictive prosecution: that the prosecutor increased the charges after Mendoza exercised a constitutional or statutory right. The court had found this claim eligible for federal review at screening but had warned that it appeared procedurally defaulted and might also have been waived by the plea agreement.

The court agreed with the respondent that the claim was procedurally defaulted and therefore did not reach the separate argument that Mendoza had waived it in his plea agreement. Procedural default generally prevents a federal court from reviewing a federal claim when the state court rejected it based on an independent and adequate state procedural rule, unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

The Monterey County Superior Court had relied on the rule that a defendant may not raise on a later state petition an issue that could have been presented at trial. The district court concluded that this was California’s contemporaneous-objection rule, that the rule was independent of federal law, and that it was firmly established and regularly followed. The California appellate and supreme courts’ unexplained denials did not eliminate the procedural bar.

Mendoza argued that his trial lawyer had raised the vindictive-prosecution issue. The court rejected that argument because Mendoza supplied no supporting evidence and because a federal habeas court may not revisit whether a state court correctly applied its own procedural rule. The court also found no evidence in the submitted record that the issue had been raised in the 2019 trial proceedings. It concluded that Mendoza had not shown cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Disposition

The court denied Mendoza’s implied motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of Claim 1. It dismissed Claim 2 because it was procedurally defaulted. Because no viable claims remained, the court dismissed Mendoza’s petition. The court also stated that a certificate of appealability would not issue and disposed of Docket Nos. 6, 9, and 10.