Doe v. County of Sonoma

Background

John Doe, proceeding without a lawyer, alleged constitutional violations arising from his involuntary detention in a psychiatric hospital under California’s Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. His claims against California and the California Attorney General had previously been dismissed with prejudice. His claims against Sonoma County and three County employees had previously been dismissed with leave to amend.

Doe filed a first amended complaint challenging the conduct of the individual County defendants and the constitutionality of the Act’s certification procedures. After an appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the state defendants but sent the claims against the County defendants back for consideration of whether Doe had stated claims against them individually and whether he had identified proper defendants for his constitutional challenge to the Act.

Steve MacDonald, Dr. Lisa Walker, and Danielle Santos filed a renewed motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint plausibly states a claim.

Section 1983 Claims

The court held that the amended complaint did not plausibly allege that the County defendants violated Doe’s constitutional rights. Doe’s main theory was that the defendants unlawfully detained him under California Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5150 and 5250 without probable cause. The court recognized a constitutional right not to be detained without probable cause but concluded that Doe had not plausibly alleged that probable cause was missing.

The complaint referred to Doe’s diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and a threat to commit “suicide by cop” about two months earlier. The court rejected Doe’s argument that the earlier threat was too stale or constituted inadmissible hearsay. It said probable-cause decisions are not controlled by strict courtroom evidence rules and may consider a person’s past conduct, character, and reputation.

The court also found that the amended complaint did not adequately state a due-process claim. Doe could not base a procedural due-process claim solely on the lack of a hearing or other review before or during the initial 72-hour detention because that detention was treated as emergency treatment for which a hearing could not be arranged immediately. The complaint also did not allege unsafe conditions, unreasonable restraints, or inadequate mental-health treatment that might support a substantive due-process claim.

The negligence claim against Santos did not plausibly allege the gross negligence, recklessness, or deliberate indifference needed for a civil-rights claim. The court also found that the alleged Second Amendment claim against MacDonald did not state facts showing that he participated in the seizure of Doe’s firearms for safekeeping during the psychiatric hold.

The defendants asserted qualified immunity, a protection that can shield government officials from individual liability unless their conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. The court did not decide that defense because the claims were not sufficiently developed for a qualified-immunity analysis. It deferred consideration of immunity until a further amended complaint was filed.

Challenge to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act

Doe alleged that the Act’s commitment-certification and review procedures lacked due process. He also challenged the requirement that patients affirmatively seek a court writ to obtain appointed counsel and judicial review, and alleged that the Act stigmatized people with mental illnesses, restricted firearm possession, and diminished their credibility under evidence law.

The court dismissed this claim with leave to amend because Doe had not named a proper defendant. A state official may be sued to stop enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute, but the official must have a sufficiently direct connection to enforcing the challenged provision. The County defendants were not state officials and therefore were not proper defendants for this claim.

State-Law Claims and Disposition

Because the federal claims had been dismissed, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority over related state-law claims, over any California claims in the amended complaint.

Judge Ponato granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The amended complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. Doe could file a complaint consistent with the order by February 15, 2023, and could not add new claims without the court’s permission. The order stated that failure to comply would result in dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).