Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Kowalski
- Richard Seeborg
- 3:21-cv-06469
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 10
In Hartford Life v. Kowalski, Judge Seeborg granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss and denied a motion to strike.
Haili Kowalski’s QDRO-based cross-claim remains pending. Her undue-influence and conversion cross-claims were subject to dismissal with leave to amend, while Marilyne Valois’s motion to strike was denied without prejudice. Hartford remains involved in resolving the competing claims to the insurance proceeds.
What happened
Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company filed the case to resolve competing claims to life-insurance proceeds after Marc Kowalski’s death. Haili Kowalski claimed the money for her and Marc’s minor son under their divorce agreement, while Marilyne Valois claimed it as the policy’s named beneficiary.
The court allowed Haili Kowalski’s claim based on the divorce agreement to continue because it likely qualified as a special domestic-relations order under federal benefits law. But it granted the motion to dismiss her undue-influence and conversion claims, allowing her to amend both. It denied the motion to strike.
Judge Seeborg ruled that the motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part, with permission to amend the dismissed claims, and that the motion to strike was denied without prejudice.
The detailed version
- Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Kowalski · No. 3:21-cv-06469
- Richard Seeborg
- Feb. 3, 2023
Background
Hartford filed an interpleader action to resolve competing claims by Haili Kowalski and Marilyne Valois to $493,000 in proceeds from a group life-insurance policy administered by Hartford. Valois was the policy’s named beneficiary. Haili Kowalski, Marc Kowalski’s former wife, claimed the proceeds on behalf of their minor son, E.K., relying on a 2010 Legal Separation Agreement requiring Marc to maintain $800,000 in life insurance naming E.K. as the sole beneficiary.
Kowalski sought a declaration that the Legal Separation Agreement was a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, or QDRO—a domestic-relations order that can give a former spouse or child priority over a policy’s named beneficiary under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, or ERISA. She alternatively alleged that Valois used undue influence to become the beneficiary, and she asserted a conversion claim. Valois moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss all three cross-claims and moved under Rule 12(f) to strike portions of the pleading.
QDRO Claim
The court denied the motion to dismiss Kowalski’s QDRO-based cross-claim. It concluded that Valois’s argument about increased benefits lacked merit because Kowalski sought only the $493,000 available under the Hartford policy, not the $800,000 referenced in the Legal Separation Agreement. The court explained that ERISA’s restriction on increased benefits primarily addresses larger ongoing payments and actuarial increases, which were not present here.
The court also rejected dismissal based solely on the Legal Separation Agreement’s failure to name the Hartford Plan. It explained that a domestic-relations order need only substantially comply with ERISA’s QDRO requirements. Although the court did not decide definitively whether the agreement was a QDRO, it stated that the agreement would likely qualify because it identified the required life-insurance obligation, the intended recipient, and the amount available under the policy. The court therefore held that Kowalski had stated a claim for relief.
Undue Influence and Motion to Strike
The court granted the motion to dismiss the undue-influence cross-claim, with leave to amend. Kowalski alleged that Valois had submitted fraudulent documents during probate proceedings, improperly accessed Marc Kowalski’s bank accounts, and influenced him to name Valois as beneficiary. The court found these allegations largely speculative and lacking facts showing how Valois influenced Marc’s beneficiary designation. It also found that alleging Marc had an alcohol-use disorder did not show that he was susceptible to influence when he made the designation.
The court denied the motion to strike, without prejudice. It explained that the motion depended primarily on the alleged defects in the undue-influence claim, and Kowalski might be able to correct those defects through amendment.
Conversion Claim
The court granted the motion to dismiss the conversion cross-claim, with leave to amend. Kowalski’s one-sentence allegation did not clearly identify what Valois allegedly converted. The court also noted that ERISA’s broad preemption rules generally cover state-law claims related to an employee-benefit plan, and Kowalski had not adequately explained why those rules would not apply. The court further noted Valois’s arguments that any claim concerning Marc’s bank accounts could fail for lack of standing or because it did not arise from the same transaction or occurrence.
Disposition
The motion to dismiss was granted as to Kowalski’s conversion and undue-influence cross-claims, with leave to amend both, and was otherwise denied. The motion to strike was denied, without prejudice. Any amended pleading had to be filed within 21 days of the order. Judge Richard Seeborg signed the order as Chief United States District Judge.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.