Behrend v. San Francisco Zen Center, Inc.

Background

Alexander Behrend sued his former employer, San Francisco Zen Center, Inc., alleging disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, and termination-related claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The opinion states that Behrend agreed to dismiss the other defendants. The Zen Center moved for summary judgment on its affirmative defense based on the First Amendment’s ministerial exception.

The Zen Center is described as a Soto Zen Buddhist church and residential training institution with programs for people learning and training in Zen Buddhism. Its residents participate in both formal practice—such as meditation, services, classes, and ceremonies—and work practice. Work practice includes tasks such as cooking, cleaning, preparing guest rooms, and ceremonial duties. The Zen Center’s materials describe work practice as an essential and indivisible part of Zen training, and describe Work Practice Apprentice positions as temporary religious-training positions.

Behrend joined the residential program after earlier volunteering and participating in Zen Center activities. He became a Work Practice Apprentice in January 2017, receiving room, board, and a stipend. His assignments included guest services and kitchen work. In September 2018, the Zen Center told him he would be reassigned to maintenance work. Behrend stated that the assignment worsened his post-traumatic stress disorder and that his request to work on another crew was denied. He alleged that the Zen Center’s later conduct, including demanding that he move out, amounted to disability discrimination.

Legal standard

The ministerial exception is an affirmative defense derived from the First Amendment’s protections for religious organizations. It prevents courts from interfering with certain employment disputes involving positions important to a religious institution’s faith, doctrine, and central mission. The Supreme Court has instructed courts to focus on what the employee does and to consider the relevant circumstances rather than apply a rigid formula based on titles, ordination, leadership, or academic requirements.

Because the Zen Center bore the burden of proving the defense, it had to show on summary judgment that no reasonable factfinder could reject the defense and that every element was established by undisputed evidence.

Court’s analysis

Behrend did not dispute that the Zen Center was a religious organization. The court therefore focused on whether his Work Practice Apprentice position fell within the ministerial exception.

The court found that Behrend held himself out as a Work Practice Apprentice and performed the responsibilities of that position. The undisputed evidence showed that the program involved both formal religious practice and work practice, and that Behrend was practicing and training in Soto Zen Buddhism while participating in the program.

The court rejected the argument that Behrend’s ordinary work duties were separate from religious activity. The Zen Center viewed all work-practice time—not only opening ceremonies, bowing, and chanting—as an expression and practice of faith. The court also found that evidence about the relative priority of work practice, or about some apprentices taking the conduct guidelines less seriously than others, did not create a genuine dispute over whether the program was religious training.

The court further held that the exception was not limited to religious leaders, ordained clergy, or people on a path to leadership. The relevant question was whether the position implicated the fundamental purpose of the exception. Because residential practice and training, including work practice, were central to the Zen Center’s mission, the court concluded that the position did so. It emphasized that requiring the Zen Center to continue housing and training a particular resident could directly interfere with the organization’s constitutional authority to decide matters of faith and doctrine.

The court also concluded that evidence from a former participant, Seigen Johnson, did not create a genuine factual dispute about Behrend’s position. The court viewed that evidence as concerning Johnson’s experience and as supporting the conclusion that residents were practicing and training in Soto Zen Buddhism.

Disposition

The court held that the ministerial exception applied as a matter of law and that San Francisco Zen Center, Inc. was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley granted the Zen Center’s motion for summary judgment and stated that the order disposed of Docket No. 63.