Trump v. Twitter, Inc

Background

In July 2021, Naomi Wolf joined Donald J. Trump and others as a plaintiff in a lawsuit against Twitter, Inc. The plaintiffs alleged that Twitter had suspended or restricted their accounts because members of Congress pressured the company. They argued that Twitter therefore acted under the state-action doctrine, which can sometimes treat a private entity’s conduct as government action for constitutional purposes, and asserted a First Amendment claim.

Wolf said Twitter suspended her account in June 2021 for “vaccine misinformation.” The complaint sought an injunction and declaratory judgment requiring Twitter to restore the plaintiffs’ accounts, remove warning labels and content classifications, and stop issuing further warnings or classifications.

The court previously granted Twitter’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that the complaint did not plausibly allege that the state-action doctrine applied to Twitter and that the plaintiffs’ ancillary claims were factually inadequate. The court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. The plaintiffs did not file an amended complaint, and judgment was entered against them. Their appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pending when this order was issued.

Rule 60(b) motion and later events

Wolf later asked the court for an indicative ruling under Rule 62.1 concerning a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(2). Rule 60(b)(2) concerns newly discovered evidence. Wolf relied on what she described as new evidence about government pressure on Twitter.

After Twitter was acquired by X Holdings I, Inc., a company owned and controlled by Elon Musk, Musk announced a general amnesty for suspended users. Wolf’s account was restored in December 2022. Twitter also announced that it was no longer enforcing its COVID-19 misleading-information policy. Twitter represented that it had placed no labels on Wolf’s tweets and had not enforced its content-moderation policies against her account since restoration. The record showed that Wolf had resumed actively using the account.

Court’s reasoning

The court held that Wolf’s First Amendment claim was moot. Mootness means that a court no longer has a live dispute to decide. Under Article III of the Constitution, an actual controversy must exist throughout the litigation, not merely when the complaint is filed. The court evaluates mootness separately for each type of relief requested.

The court found no continuing harm that an injunction could address. Twitter had restored Wolf’s account, she was actively tweeting, and she had effectively received the injunctive relief she requested. The court stated that there was no other meaningful relief it could order on the claim.

The court rejected Wolf’s reference to the voluntary-cessation exception. That exception can prevent a defendant from making a case moot simply by temporarily stopping allegedly unlawful conduct to avoid judicial review. The court found that the exception did not apply because the record did not show that Twitter changed its conduct because of the lawsuit. Instead, the changes followed the acquisition by new ownership and its announced policies. The court also found that the changes were not shown to be temporary.

The court likewise rejected Wolf’s argument that the claim was capable of repetition yet evading review, an exception for extraordinary disputes that end too quickly to be fully litigated but are reasonably likely to recur. The court said the same circumstances defeating the voluntary-cessation argument also defeated this exception.

The court also addressed Wolf’s statement that she had lost business, investors, and income. It concluded that the only claim at issue in the Rule 60(b) motion was the First Amendment claim. The court further stated that, even assuming for purposes of discussion that the state-action theory applied, there was no legal basis for damages against Twitter for the alleged First Amendment violation.

Disposition

Judge Donato concluded that Wolf had no live First Amendment claim against Twitter and that the proffered new evidence did not change the mootness analysis. The court denied the Rule 60(b) motion.