Shahid Buttar for Congress Committee v. Hearst Communications, Inc.

Background

Shahid Buttar and Shahid Buttar for Congress Committee, collectively referred to as SBCC, sued Hearst Communications, Inc. The complaint asserted defamation and a related claim under California’s unfair competition law. The claims arose from two San Francisco Chronicle articles published in July 2020 about Elizabeth Croydon’s allegations that Buttar had sexually harassed her. Buttar was then a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives.

The first article reported Croydon’s allegations, Buttar’s denials, and responses from political organizations and officials. The follow-up article reported on an open letter supporting Buttar and interviews with several supporters, while also reporting Croydon’s response. SBCC alleged that the follow-up article was misleading because it described supporters as Buttar’s friends and did not provide more information about Croydon’s alleged history of making false accusations. SBCC also alleged that Hearst’s reporting harmed Buttar’s campaigns and future opportunities.

The court had previously dismissed claims concerning the first article with prejudice and allowed SBCC to amend its claims concerning the follow-up article. SBCC filed a First Amended Complaint, and Hearst again moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim, and under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. That statute permits early dismissal of lawsuits arising from protected speech when the plaintiff cannot show a probability of success.

Requests for Judicial Notice

The court granted Hearst’s request for judicial notice of documents referenced in the amended complaint, including the two Chronicle articles, other news articles, Croydon’s essay, the open letter, and email correspondence. The court also granted SBCC’s request for judicial notice of print versions of the Chronicle articles and another referenced article. Judicial notice allows a court to accept certain facts or documents without requiring formal proof when the information is publicly available or readily verifiable and not reasonably disputed.

Anti-SLAPP Analysis

The court applied the anti-SLAPP statute’s two-step framework. First, it held that SBCC’s claims arose from Hearst’s publication of news articles in a public forum concerning a matter of public interest: allegations against a congressional candidate, his response, and the public reaction. SBCC did not dispute that the first step was satisfied.

Second, the court considered whether SBCC showed a probability of prevailing on its defamation claim. Because Buttar was a public figure, the court stated that SBCC had to plausibly show falsity and actual malice. Actual malice in this context means that the publisher knew a statement was false or acted with serious doubts about whether it was false.

The court held that SBCC did not plausibly allege falsity. It found that the follow-up article did not state or imply that Croydon’s allegations had been proven, and that the article reported Buttar’s denial. The court also concluded that SBCC’s allegations about Hearst’s failure to interview preferred sources or include additional information about Croydon did not identify any specific factual statement in the article that was false.

The court separately held that SBCC did not plausibly allege actual malice. The amended complaint did not show that the supporters who signed the open letter had direct knowledge about whether Croydon’s allegations against Buttar were true. It also did not establish that information from Chris Sampson, who called Croydon a “pathological liar,” came from a firsthand or otherwise sufficiently reliable source. The court emphasized that failing to investigate, by itself, does not establish actual malice.

The court further noted that the follow-up article summarized the open letter, described its signatories, and quoted several supporters of Buttar. Because SBCC failed to show a probability of success on its defamation claim, the court concluded that the anti-SLAPP statute barred the suit. The court said it did not need to address damages.

Unfair Competition Claim and Leave to Amend

The opinion describes SBCC’s unfair competition claim as derivative of its defamation claim. Because the defamation claim failed, the amended complaint did not survive the motion to dismiss. The court determined that another amendment was not warranted after SBCC had already amended its complaint and again failed to cure the identified deficiencies.

Disposition

The court granted Hearst’s request for judicial notice and granted SBCC’s request for judicial notice. It granted Hearst’s motion to dismiss with prejudice, entered judgment for Hearst, and directed the clerk to close the case.