Williams v. Alameda County Board of Supervisors

Background

The court addressed motions in two related cases. In the first case, John Williams, Robert Vogel, Sheanna Rogers, Michael Loeb, Jaqueline Watson-Baker, and Housing Providers of America sued Alameda County, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors, the City of Oakland, the Oakland City Council, and Does 1–10; Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment Action was an intervenor-defendant. In the second case, California Apartment Association, Stephen Lin, Rakesh and Tripti Jain, H. Alex and Dannie Alvarez, and others sued the County of Alameda, the Board of Supervisors of the County of Alameda, and Does 10–25.

The plaintiffs challenged ordinances that prohibited or restricted evictions of non-paying tenants during the COVID-19 pandemic. Their claims included alleged physical or per se takings under the Fifth Amendment, inverse condemnation under the California Constitution, due-process and equal-protection violations, a Contracts Clause violation, and state-law preemption or other state-law violations. The court had previously denied the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs then moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to certify that summary-judgment order for interlocutory appeal and to stay the cases.

Legal standard

Section 1292(b) permits a district court to certify a nonfinal order for immediate appellate review when the order involves: (1) a controlling question of law, (2) substantial grounds for disagreement about that question, and (3) an immediate appeal that may materially advance the litigation’s ultimate termination. Certification is reserved for exceptional situations in which an appeal would avoid extended and expensive litigation.

Analysis

The plaintiffs sought certification of four issues: whether the ordinances were physical or per se takings, whether the County ordinance violated the Contracts Clause, whether the ordinances violated procedural due process, and whether they were preempted by or violated state law.

The court held that the physical-takings issue satisfied the first two requirements. It was a controlling legal question, and the law was unclear. The court described disagreement among decisions involving the Supreme Court’s decisions in Yee v. Escondido and Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, Ninth Circuit landlord-tenant precedent, and an Eighth Circuit decision involving a COVID-19 eviction moratorium. The court also noted that the Ninth Circuit had not analyzed an eviction moratorium under the Takings Clause.

The court nevertheless concluded that the third requirement was not met. The same physical-takings issue was already fully briefed before the Ninth Circuit in El Papel, LLC v. City of Seattle. That appeal concerned whether COVID-19 eviction moratoria were physical takings and presented the same controlling legal question identified in these cases. Because another appeal was already addressing the issue, an additional immediate appeal would be wasteful rather than materially advancing the litigation.

The court declined to certify the Contracts Clause issue. It said Ninth Circuit precedent had already addressed the applicable legal standard and conflicted with the Eighth Circuit decision relied on by the plaintiffs. The court also characterized the issue as a mixed question of law and fact rather than a pure legal question suitable for interlocutory review.

The court likewise declined to certify the procedural-due-process issue. It had previously rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the ordinances gave tenants an absolute defense that allowed them to act as judges in their own cases. The court found no substantial grounds for disagreement and also treated the issue as a mixed question of law and fact.

Finally, the court declined to certify the state-law issues. It reasoned that relevant California law allowed local governments to adopt eviction restrictions that provided greater tenant protection, that the ordinances included exceptions for Ellis Act evictions, and that the County and City had authority to enact the ordinances. The court also said one argument about ending the local emergency was outside the scope of the facial challenge and involved a mixed question of law and fact.

Disposition

The court denied the motions to certify the summary-judgment order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The court’s conclusion specifically states that the physical-takings issue would otherwise satisfy the certification requirements but did not satisfy the requirement that an immediate appeal materially advance the litigation because the issue was already fully briefed before the Ninth Circuit.

The opinion also contains a partially garbled passage concerning a temporary stay and the defendants’ request for a further stay while the Ninth Circuit considered three COVID-19 eviction-moratorium cases. The provided text does not clearly state a final ruling on that separate stay request.