Straw v. LinkedIn Corp.

Background

Andrew U.D. Straw filed an employment discrimination complaint against LinkedIn, alleging that LinkedIn closed his longstanding account after he complained about discrimination by his former employer, the Indiana Supreme Court. The opinion states that Straw is a lawyer and is representing himself. He was allowed to proceed without paying the filing fee, and the United States Marshals Service completed service on LinkedIn.

Straw later filed a notice stating that he wanted to remove two Indiana state-court cases to the Northern District of California. Those cases appeared to arise from proceedings in which the State of Indiana suspended his law licenses. Straw’s amended complaint added the State of Indiana and G. Michael Witte as defendants, and he moved for the court to issue summonses and direct the Marshals Service to serve them.

The court had previously screened Straw’s amended complaint and found that his attempted removal of the Indiana cases was improper. It allowed him to file a second amended complaint addressing the identified problems. Straw then filed a document intended to be his second amended complaint, along with an unauthorized memorandum. The opinion noted that the second amended complaint improperly incorporated the prior complaint and exhibits instead of reproducing the pleading completely, contrary to a local rule.

Court’s analysis

Because Straw was proceeding without paying the filing fee, the court was required to screen his pleadings. That screening applies to non-prisoners as well as prisoners and requires dismissal if a pleading is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks money from a defendant immune from such relief.

The court concluded that Straw could not add Indiana or Witte through the purported removal of the two Indiana cases. Under the federal removal statute, a defendant seeking removal must file the notice in the federal district and division where the state case is pending. Straw argued that he could not remove the cases to the proper federal district in Indiana because he was barred from filing documents in courts in the Seventh Circuit. He cited no authority allowing removal elsewhere for that reason.

The court also rejected Straw’s argument that the State of Indiana and Witte could simply be added as defendants to a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO, claim. RICO prohibits specified conduct involving an enterprise, income from a pattern of racketeering activity, unlawful debt, or conspiracies to commit those violations. The court found that Straw’s pleadings did not allege facts supporting any of those types of RICO claims. Instead, the pleadings indicated that he was using RICO to challenge rulings in the Indiana cases and to obtain federal jurisdiction over those matters.

The court further noted that Straw sought declarations and an injunction concerning the suspension of his law licenses, but alleged no facts or cited no authority showing that this court could order Indiana or Witte to provide that relief. It concluded that Straw could not properly add Indiana or Witte through removal, that he otherwise failed to state a claim against them, and that the problems did not appear correctable through another amended pleading.

Recommendation and reassignment

The magistrate judge recommended that Straw’s motion for service of Indiana and Witte be denied and that Indiana and Witte be dismissed from the case without leave to amend. The recommendation did not state a disposition of Straw’s claims against LinkedIn.

The court explained that all parties must consent before a magistrate judge may hear and decide the case. Because that consent was incomplete and deciding the service motion appeared to require a ruling disposing of Straw’s second amended complaint against Indiana and Witte, the Clerk was directed to reassign the action to a district judge. The report also stated that the case could be reassigned back to the magistrate judge if Straw voluntarily dropped Indiana and Witte or they were otherwise dismissed. Any party could file objections within 14 days after service.