Gescheidt v. Haaland

Background

Plaintiffs sued Deb Haaland and other defendants, including the National Park Service, over the agency’s management of tule elk at Tomales Point in Point Reyes National Seashore. Plaintiffs alleged that drought had caused severe shortages of food and water and that the elk population had declined from 445 to 293 in 2020 and then to 221 in 2021. They contended that the Park Service’s failure to revise the 1980 General Management Plan for more than forty years contributed to inadequate protection of the elk.

The case concerned 54 U.S.C. § 100502, which says that general management plans for units of the National Park System “shall be prepared and revised in a timely manner.” Plaintiffs brought a claim under § 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which permits a court to compel agency action that was unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. In the amended complaint, plaintiffs challenged only the failure to revise the 1980 plan as it applied to Tomales Point; they did not challenge the separate 1998 Tule Elk Management Plan.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which ask the court to decide a claim without a trial when there is no genuine dispute over a material fact.

Standing

The Park Service argued that plaintiffs lacked standing, meaning they had not shown the required connection between the alleged violation and an injury that a court could remedy. The court rejected that argument. It concluded that plaintiffs had shown a procedural injury tied to concrete aesthetic and recreational interests. Plaintiffs submitted evidence that they regularly visited Tomales Point, enjoyed observing and photographing the elk, and were concerned that the elk’s condition impaired those interests.

The court declined to hold that a plaintiff can establish this type of procedural injury only when the statute provides a right to public notice and comment. It also held that plaintiffs had sufficiently shown causation and redressability. Because a revised management plan could be influenced by considerations concerning elk health and safety, plaintiffs did not have to prove that a revised plan would definitely produce different management decisions.

Whether the APA Claim Was Enforceable

The court then considered whether § 100502 created the kind of duty that could be enforced under § 706(1). Under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, § 706(1) applies only when an agency has failed to take a discrete action that it is legally required to take. Courts may not use that provision to supervise broad agency programs or decide policy questions left to agency discretion.

Plaintiffs argued that the word “shall” made the Park Service’s duty to revise its plan mandatory. The Park Service argued that the statute did not specify when a revision had to occur or how the agency should carry it out, leaving the matter to agency discretion.

The court agreed with the Park Service. It read “in a timely manner” in the context of general management plans, which cover complex, long-term issues concerning preservation, development, visitor use, carrying capacity, and possible boundary changes. The phrase did not identify a definite time for revision and required consideration of surrounding circumstances. The court therefore held that § 100502 did not impose a non-discretionary duty enforceable under § 706(1).

Because the statute was not enforceable through the plaintiffs’ APA claim, the court did not decide whether the Park Service had in fact delayed revising the 1980 plan unreasonably. The court stated that plaintiffs had not identified a viable legal basis allowing them, or the court, to intervene in the Park Service’s wildlife-management decisions.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment. It directed the Clerk to enter judgment for defendants and close the case.