Lions Club of Albany, California v. City of Albany

Background

An electrically illuminated Latin cross had stood 28 feet tall atop Albany Hill since 1971. The City of Albany owns the land beneath and around the cross for use as a public park, while the Lions Club owns an easement allowing access to maintain it.

The Lions Club previously sued the City in federal court over alleged First Amendment violations concerning the lighting of the cross during the Christmas holiday. In that earlier case, this court found that the Lions Club had a valid easement and that the City had violated the Establishment Clause by purchasing the land and leaving the cross in the middle of a public park. The court discussed possible ways to address the violation, including selling a parcel containing the cross to a private party or condemning the easement through eminent domain. The earlier case later settled.

In May 2022, the City began an eminent-domain action against the Lions Club in the Superior Court of the County of Alameda. Judge Somnath Raj Chatterjee granted the City “prejudgment possession” of the easement, allowing the City to remove the cross and store it safely while the eminent-domain case proceeded toward trial. The Lions Club sought federal relief instead of seeking relief from the California Court of Appeal.

This court initially issued a clarification stating that its earlier discussion had been dictum—not an order directing the City to take action—and temporarily stopped removal of the cross until Judge Chatterjee could reconsider his order. The clarification stated that the injunction would automatically end after Judge Chatterjee ruled again and advised the Lions Club to take any disagreement to the California Court of Appeal.

After reviewing the clarification and hearing further argument, Judge Chatterjee reaffirmed his decision granting the City prejudgment possession. The Lions Club then asked this federal court for another temporary restraining order to keep the cross in place. Its petition to the California Court of Appeal seeking a stay had been denied for technical reasons that the opinion described as curable.

Analysis

The court treated the Lions Club’s request as a de facto appeal of Judge Chatterjee’s reaffirmation order. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally prevents a federal district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a case that seeks to correct an allegedly erroneous state-court judgment or obtain relief from that judgment.

The court identified both required features. First, the Lions Club claimed that Judge Chatterjee’s order was legally wrong because it allegedly failed to weigh constitutional considerations involving religious free exercise, declined to consider submitted declarations, and failed to account for significant hardships. Second, the Lions Club asked the federal court to remedy that alleged error by keeping the cross from being removed.

The court rejected the argument that the presence of First Amendment issues allowed the federal case to proceed. It distinguished the authority cited by the Lions Club because that case did not involve state-court litigants trying to appeal a state-court ruling in federal district court. The court also explained that abstention and subject-matter jurisdiction are different issues. Because it found no subject-matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman, it stated that the federal rules required dismissal of the action if that jurisdictional conclusion remained in place.

The court expressly did not decide the merits of the Lions Club’s religious-free-exercise argument. It requested, but did not order, that the state courts consider that argument if the Lions Club substantially complied with the state appellate rules.

Disposition

The court denied the Lions Club’s application for a temporary restraining order and denied its request for a further injunction. It requested, but did not order, that the cross not be disturbed for 14 days to give the Lions Club an opportunity to seek appellate relief in the California courts. The court ordered both sides to show cause within 14 calendar days why the federal action should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The opinion did not itself state that the action was dismissed.