Drevaleva v. The Narayan Travelstead Professional Law Corporation

Background

Alameda Health System hired Drevaleva as a part-time employee in April 2013 and terminated her in September of that year. Drevaleva believed she was fired for participating in legally protected activities. After an administrative agency dismissed her claim, she filed an earlier lawsuit involving Alameda Health System and the agency.

This case concerned the conduct of the law corporation, Timothy Travelstead, Julie Cho, and Alameda Health System while defending that earlier lawsuit. Drevaleva alleged, among other things, that defendants failed to cite a particular statute, included hearsay, made an allegedly incorrect statement about Alameda Health System’s status, and relied on irrelevant legal authorities. Her complaint asserted 18 claims under federal statutes, the federal Constitution, and California law. She sought reinstatement, lost salary, and substantial damages.

Motion and legal standard

Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), arguing that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that Drevaleva had failed to state legally sufficient claims. The court explained that this motion uses the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. A complaint must provide enough factual allegations to make liability plausible, rather than merely reciting the elements of a claim.

Court’s reasoning

The court held that Drevaleva could not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because she did not allege that defendants acted under color of state law while defending the earlier lawsuit. The court also held that her claims under §§ 1981 and 1985 lacked allegations of purposeful discrimination or racial or other class-based discriminatory animus.

The court further held that Drevaleva failed to state claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the Eighth Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment, or the Fourteenth Amendment. It reasoned that defendants’ filing of motions and presentation of arguments did not constitute racketeering activity, coercion into slavery, punishment for a crime, or deprivation of liberty or property.

The court concluded that all of Drevaleva’s claims rested on defendants’ litigation activity in the earlier case. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, a legal principle that generally protects efforts to ask a court for relief and conduct incidental to that effort, such activity is immune from liability unless it is objectively baseless and therefore a sham. The court found that defendants’ conduct was not a sham, noting that the court and the Ninth Circuit had ruled for Alameda Health System in the earlier case. The court therefore concluded that the doctrine would bar the federal claims even if Drevaleva were allowed to amend her complaint.

Because no viable federal claims remained, the court said it lacked, and in any event would not exercise, supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. The court also noted that claim preclusion might bar some claims but stated that its ruling did not turn on that issue.

Other rulings and disposition

The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. It denied Drevaleva’s motions to file supplemental briefs as moot and denied the request for additional briefing concerning the status of Alameda Health System and claim preclusion. The court granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings with prejudice.

The court also applied an existing pre-filing order because Drevaleva was proceeding without a lawyer, had previously been declared a vexatious litigant, and had filed this action against Alameda Health System and asserted similar types of claims. It ordered her to refrain from further filings in this or related cases involving Alameda Health System unless she first obtained the court’s permission. The court warned that filings made without permission could lead to a contempt hearing, other sanctions, and dismissal. The clerk was directed to enter judgment and close the case.