Santos v. County of Humboldt

Background

Steven A. Santos sued the County of Humboldt, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The opinion states that Santos is employed as a Senior Planner by the County’s Planning and Building Department and suffers from chronic migraines that interfere with his ability to work.

Santos alleged that, in 2019, the County accepted documentation of his condition, allowed him to work in a private office, and permitted a schedule involving flexible hours. He further alleged that in February 2021 he was told to sit at a front counter even when customers were not present. He also alleged that the County required him to participate again in the ADA’s interactive process, removed the flexible-schedule portion of his accommodation, required or threatened a fitness-for-duty examination, sought medical information, and invaded his medical privacy.

The amended complaint asserted three ADA claims: retaliation, interference, and discrimination. Santos identified as protected activities asking for ADA accommodations, complaining to the County’s human-resources office under its equal-employment-opportunity policy, and complaining to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. He also requested $1,650 in attorney’s fees.

Legal standard

The County moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally valid claim. At this stage, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and views them in the plaintiff’s favor, but it does not accept legal conclusions, conclusory statements, or unreasonable inferences as facts. A complaint must contain factual allegations that make a claim for relief plausible, rather than merely reciting legal elements.

The court also explained that leave to amend generally should be granted unless it is clear that the complaint cannot be fixed through additional allegations.

Court’s analysis

Retaliation. The court held that Santos had not adequately alleged an adverse employment action or a causal connection between his protected activities and an adverse action. After removing argumentative and conclusory descriptions, the allegations concerned Santos’s dissatisfaction with the interactive process, requests for information, a fitness-for-duty examination, and his accommodations. The court concluded that these allegations did not identify the type of adverse employment action required for an ADA retaliation claim. It also stated that a failure to accommodate is a separate ADA claim and cannot serve as the adverse employment action for a retaliation claim. Claim 1, retaliation, was dismissed without prejudice, with one final opportunity to amend.

Interference. The court held that Santos had not alleged the type of coercion, intimidation, or threat covered by the ADA’s interference provision. Relying on Ninth Circuit authority, the court explained that an interference claim requires a distinct and palpable injury, such as giving up ADA rights or suffering another injury because of a threat or refusal to give up those rights. The court found that Santos had alleged only dissatisfaction with the interactive process and the removal of his flexible work schedule, which it determined was not the required palpable injury. Claim 2, interference, was dismissed without prejudice, with one final opportunity to amend.

Discrimination. The court stated that an ADA discrimination claim requires allegations that the plaintiff is disabled under the ADA, can perform the job’s essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, and suffered an adverse employment action because of the disability. The court found that Santos had adequately alleged, at most, the first element, and had not adequately alleged an adverse employment action or a connection between his disability and such an action. Claim 3, discrimination, was dismissed without prejudice, with one final opportunity to amend.

Attorney’s-fee request. The court struck Santos’s request for $1,650 in attorney’s fees. The opinion says it was unclear whether the request concerned work Santos performed himself or fees paid to an attorney for help with the interactive process. The court stated that pro se litigants—people who represent themselves—may not recover attorney’s fees for their own work, and struck the request because Santos did not have an attorney.

Disposition

The court granted the County’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice. Santos may file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the order. The order states that this is his final opportunity to amend and that failure to file an amendment within that period will result in dismissal of the entire action with prejudice and entry of judgment.