Stebbins v. Polano

Background

The court had previously denied David Stebbins’s motion for default judgment and dismissed the action on July 11, 2022. Stebbins then sought reconsideration and relief from the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). He also requested recusal, meaning that the judge step aside because of alleged bias.

Stebbins identified five asserted errors: allowing Alphabet and YouTube to intervene; finding that his livestream video had minimal creativity; considering allegations in his second amended complaint that he characterized as inadmissible; failing to consider evidence about the Copyright Office’s knowledge of errors in his registration application; and failing to address his claim against Raul Mateas under Section 512(f)(1) of the Copyright Act.

Motion for Reconsideration

The court denied reconsideration under Civil Local Rule 7-9. That rule permits reconsideration only when there is a material difference in facts or law, new material facts or a change in law, or a clear failure to consider material facts or decisive legal arguments previously presented. The rule also does not permit a party to use reconsideration simply to repeat earlier arguments.

The court rejected Stebbins’s challenge to intervention because it had already considered and rejected that argument. It likewise concluded that Stebbins was attempting to reargue issues already decided concerning the livestream’s creativity and human authorship. The court reiterated that the allegations in the second amended complaint established that the livestream lacked the minimum creativity required for copyright protection and lacked human authorship. It also stated that Stebbins could not amend the complaint to cure those defects by contradicting his original allegations.

The court found no basis for reconsideration concerning the Copyright Office evidence. Stebbins did not identify the evidence he claimed the court had overlooked. To the extent he referred to a request for judicial notice, the court found that request inadequate because he supplied no source material showing that the asserted fact was not reasonably disputable and could be accurately determined from a source that could not reasonably be questioned.

The court acknowledged that its earlier dismissal order had not expressly addressed Stebbins’s request for default judgment against Mateas on the Section 512(f) misrepresentation claim. It nevertheless reviewed that request and concluded that default judgment was not warranted. A defendant’s default does not automatically require judgment; the court has discretion and may consider the factors identified in Eitel v. McCool.

The court determined that the first two Eitel factors—the merits of the claim and the sufficiency of the complaint—did not favor default judgment. Section 512(f)(1) requires an allegation that the defendant knowingly and materially misrepresented that copyright infringement occurred. Stebbins alleged that Mateas issued a fraudulent takedown notice concerning a video that displayed a screenshot containing Mateas’s Discord icon, but the court found that Stebbins had not alleged specific facts showing how or why Mateas knew, or should have known, that the material was non-infringing.

The court also found that Stebbins had not established damages. Although he alleged lost views and advertising revenue while the video was unavailable, he did not address the damages element in his motion or provide sufficient evidence connecting damages to the alleged misrepresentation. The court further found that the amount sought—$1,800,000—favored denying default judgment because the video was restored after nineteen days. The prejudice factor and the policy favoring decisions on the merits also did not favor default judgment. The court therefore denied reconsideration.

Relief from Judgment

The court denied Stebbins’s motion under Rule 60(b)(6), which allows relief from a judgment for another reason that justifies relief. The court explained that this provision is used sparingly to prevent serious unfairness and requires extraordinary circumstances, including injury and circumstances beyond the party’s control that prevented proper prosecution or defense of the case. Because Stebbins relied on the same grounds raised in his reconsideration motion, and Rule 60(b)(6) is not a substitute for an appeal or a method for correcting alleged court error, the court denied relief.

Recusal

The court denied Stebbins’s request for recusal. Stebbins argued that the court held a personal grudge against him and dismissed the case to punish him for allegedly abusive behavior. The court found the request moot because reconsideration and relief from judgment were not warranted. It also ruled that an adverse judicial ruling is not an adequate basis for recusal and that Stebbins had not shown grounds requiring the judge to step aside.

Disposition

The court denied Stebbins’s motion for reconsideration, motion for relief from judgment, and motion for recusal.