Washington v. Serrato

Background

Tracye Benard Washington, a California inmate who was representing himself, sued staff at Salinas Valley State Prison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleged that, on June 19, 2022, Officers J. Serrato and C. Diaz had an antagonistic exchange with him, after which Serrato and Sgt. B. Akin allegedly pepper-sprayed him while he was seated in a wheelchair. Washington also alleged that Officer E. Guijarro pushed him by the back of the neck, that he was struck in the ribs, handcuffed, dragged, and taken for medical treatment. The next day, he was charged with battery on a peace officer and placed in administrative segregation.

Washington asserted claims for excessive force under the Eighth Amendment, violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act, conspiracy to assault him, racial discrimination under what he called the “1965 Civil Rights Act,” and due-process violations based on allegedly false or inaccurate disciplinary reports. He sought damages, injunctive relief requiring body cameras for prison guards, and a restraining order.

Screening standard

Because Washington was a prisoner suing governmental employees, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The court had to identify claims that failed to state a claim for relief or sought money from an immune defendant, while reading his self-represented complaint liberally.

Claims allowed to proceed

The court held that Washington stated a legally sufficient excessive-force claim against Serrato, Guijarro, and Akin. The allegations, taken as true at this stage, described force that could have been used maliciously or sadistically rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore prison discipline.

The court also held that Washington stated conspiracy claims against Serrato, Guijarro, and Akin based on their alleged coordinated conduct during the force incident. It additionally found a conspiracy claim against Diaz based on her alleged role in preparing a disciplinary report that portrayed the other defendants’ actions as justified. The court explained that conspiracy is not an independent constitutional violation under § 1983; it must be connected to an underlying constitutional violation.

Claims dismissed with leave to amend

The court dismissed the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims with leave to amend. Washington alleged that he had a physical disability requiring handrails and a wheelchair, but the complaint did not allege that he was denied a prison service, program, or activity solely because of his disability. It also did not allege the facts needed for a Rehabilitation Act claim involving a federally funded service. The court stated that the appropriate defendants would be the responsible public entity or program, rather than individual officers, and that the requested body-camera injunction was not shown to be a relevant remedy. The court also noted that money damages under Title II of the ADA require an allegation of discriminatory intent, which the complaint lacked.

The court construed Washington’s reference to the “1965 Civil Rights Act” as an equal-protection claim based on alleged racial discrimination. It dismissed that claim with leave to amend because alleging that the incident occurred on Juneteenth was not enough to show racial discrimination. The court said Washington needed to provide facts showing intentional discrimination, including how similarly situated prisoners were treated differently, against each defendant he believed responsible.

The court also dismissed the due-process claims with leave to amend. Washington did not explain what disciplinary deprivations he suffered, whether he was found guilty, what sanctions resulted, or whether he was denied any required disciplinary protections. The order’s discussion refers to amending this claim against Defendant Tapia, while the conclusion identifies the due-process claims against Diaz and Akin; the opinion does not explain this difference.

Official-capacity damages

Washington sued the defendants in both their individual and official capacities. The court dismissed with prejudice his claims for damages based on defendants’ official-capacity conduct because the Eleventh Amendment bars those claims against state officials in federal court. The court advised him to identify the defendants as being sued only in their individual capacities in an amended complaint.

Disposition and next steps

The court ordered that the complaint’s cognizable claims were the excessive-force claims against Serrato, Guijarro, and Akin, and the conspiracy claims against Serrato, Guijarro, Akin, and Diaz. The ADA/Rehabilitation Act, equal-protection, and due-process claims were dismissed with leave to amend. Washington had 28 days from the filing of the order to file an amended complaint or notify the court that he wished to proceed only on the cognizable claims. The order stated that an amended complaint would replace the original complaint, and that claims or defendants omitted from it would no longer be part of the case. It further stated that failure to respond as ordered would result in dismissal with prejudice of the deficient claims.