Malberg v. McCracken

Background

Martin Malberg, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Judge Joanne McCracken, Judge Christine Garcia-Sen, California Attorney General Rob Bonta, and the State of California. The suit arose from a domestic-violence restraining order that Malberg’s wife requested in California state court during dissolution proceedings. Judge McCracken issued a temporary order, and Judge Garcia-Sen later issued a restraining order after a hearing. The state court entered a final judgment of dissolution shortly afterward.

Malberg asked the federal court to stop the state proceedings, remove or nullify the restraining order, vacate the state-court judgments and rulings, invalidate the California Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), award damages, and impose criminal penalties or refer the defendants for criminal prosecution.

Claims and jurisdiction

The complaint cited the First Amendment, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court treated the First Amendment as the constitutional right asserted through Section 1983 because the First Amendment itself does not provide a private enforcement mechanism. The court also considered Malberg’s requests for criminal penalties under the federal criminal statutes.

The court dismissed the criminal-statute claims for lack of standing and without leave to amend because private individuals cannot use those statutes to obtain civil relief or criminal penalties.

Rooker-Feldman doctrine

The court held that the complaint primarily challenged the state-court restraining order and sought relief that would nullify or overturn it. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally prevents a federal district court from acting as an appellate court reviewing a state-court judgment. The court found that Malberg alleged the state court had made an erroneous decision and sought relief from that decision, satisfying the doctrine’s requirements.

The court also concluded that the relevant state-court decisions were sufficiently final for purposes of the doctrine because the restraining order had been issued and the state court had entered a dissolution judgment. It therefore dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The court recognized that a facial challenge to the DVPA—that is, a challenge to the statute generally rather than only to how it was applied to Malberg—would not necessarily be barred by Rooker-Feldman. But the complaint did not explain the specific provision or operation of the DVPA that allegedly violated the First Amendment. The allegations were too vague to separate a possible facial challenge from an improper appeal of the state proceedings.

Immunity defenses

The court ruled that the claims against Judges McCracken and Garcia-Sen could not proceed under any plausible reading of the complaint. Claims against them were intertwined with their state-court decisions and therefore fell within Rooker-Feldman. In addition, judges have absolute judicial immunity from civil-rights suits based on actions taken in their judicial capacity, unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. The court found that Malberg’s allegations of error, bad faith, or actions beyond the judges’ authority did not overcome that immunity.

As to California, the court held that the State was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity from Malberg’s facial constitutional challenge. The court explained that this immunity does not always bar a suit against a state officer seeking prospective relief, but such a suit requires a sufficient connection between the officer and enforcement of the challenged statute.

The court found that Malberg had not alleged facts showing that Attorney General Bonta had a sufficiently direct connection to enforcement of the DVPA. However, the court concluded that amendment might not be futile because Malberg could potentially allege facts establishing such a connection or name a proper state official.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. It dismissed without leave to amend: (1) claims seeking to enforce 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242; (2) claims against Judge McCracken and Judge Garcia-Sen; and (3) claims against the State of California. It dismissed with leave to amend the claim against Attorney General Bonta, but only for the limited purpose of presenting a facial constitutional challenge to the DVPA. The court stated that Malberg could add additional defendants for that purpose and could file an amended complaint within 30 days.

The court also denied Malberg’s motion seeking recusal of the defendants’ attorneys and removal of their filings.