Khan v. Payton

Background

Muhammad Khan, a state prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against an officer at San Quentin State Prison. The court had previously screened Khan’s first amended complaint, identified some claims as legally sufficient to proceed, dismissed others, and allowed Khan to amend an equal-protection claim. Khan later filed a second amended complaint, but it contained only his causes of action and a few pages of the first amended complaint.

Khan told the court that he was indigent and could not afford the envelopes and postage needed to mail the entire pleading. The court therefore construed the second amended complaint as an amendment to the first amended complaint. The first amended complaint remained the operative complaint, with the amendment replacing paragraphs 89 and later paragraphs. The court vacated and struck its earlier order screening the second amended complaint.

Screening and Claims

The court conducted screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires courts to review prisoner complaints against governmental entities or officials and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, inadequately pleaded, or seek money from an immune defendant. The court said that pleadings filed without a lawyer must be read liberally.

The court determined that the amended complaint stated potentially viable claims involving:

- The First Amendment, based on denial of meals needed for Khan’s religious practice; - The Eighth Amendment, based on deprivation of food for two days; - Due process, based on the alleged arbitrary denial of Ramadan meals by M. Payton; and - State-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent hiring, training, or supervision.

The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority to hear related state-law claims in the same case, over the adequately pleaded state-law claims.

Khan also asserted a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, seeking declaratory relief rather than damages, against San Quentin State Prison. The court held that the allegations did not state a claim against the prison because the alleged deprivation resulted from the actions of employees who failed to provide meals, rather than from the prison’s program or activity. The court dismissed that claim for failure to state a claim and denied further leave to amend, stating that another amendment would be futile and would cause undue delay.

The court also stated that Khan no longer wished to pursue his equal-protection claim. It therefore struck that claim from the action. The order states that all other claims were stricken.

Disposition and Next Steps

The action was allowed to proceed on the First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, due-process, and state-law claims against M. Payton and Healy. M. Payton had already been served. The clerk was directed to arrange service on Correctional Officer Healy through the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s electronic service program for prisoner civil-rights cases.

The defendants were directed to file a motion for summary judgment or another dispositive motion within 91 days after the order was filed. A motion for summary judgment asks the court to enter judgment without a trial when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over facts important to the claims. The order also set deadlines for Khan’s opposition and the defendants’ reply, advised Khan about the consequences of failing to respond, and permitted discovery under the federal rules.

Judge Beth Labson Freeman’s order vacated the prior screening order, dismissed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim for failure to state a claim, struck the equal-protection and other non-cognizable claims, and directed the remaining claims toward further proceedings. It did not resolve the ultimate merits of the remaining claims.