Suazo v. Bluemercury, Inc.

Background

Albert Paris Suazo and Alexa Suart, who were employed in California as hourly, nonexempt store managers for Bluemercury, Inc., brought wage-and-hour claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). They also brought California-law claims for a proposed class of California store managers. The California class claims were not at issue in this order.

Four other Bluemercury store managers—Ruben Bermudez, Gustavo Espinoza, Leyna Hanson, and Katherine Henriksen—filed written consents to join the proposed FLSA collective action. They had worked in Maryland, Florida, South Carolina, and Minnesota. The court described this case as the plaintiffs’ second attempt to pursue a nationwide FLSA collective action. In the earlier round, a court declined to conditionally certify a nationwide collective after finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over claims by store managers who did not work in New York.

Bluemercury moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) to dismiss the claims of the four out-of-state opt-in plaintiffs for lack of personal jurisdiction. In the alternative, Bluemercury sought judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), arguing that the plaintiffs were barred from relitigating the personal-jurisdiction issue decided in the earlier round.

Whether the Motion Was Proper

The court first considered whether Bluemercury could challenge personal jurisdiction before the FLSA collective had received conditional or preliminary certification. The plaintiffs argued that the opt-in plaintiffs were more like unnamed members of a proposed class than parties to the lawsuit.

The court rejected that characterization. It explained that an FLSA collective action is a group of individual plaintiffs, not a representative action under Rule 23. Workers become parties by filing written consents, and opt-in plaintiffs have the same status regarding the lawsuit’s claims as the original named plaintiffs. The lack of conditional certification therefore did not prevent Bluemercury from asserting a personal-jurisdiction defense against the four opt-in plaintiffs.

Specific Personal Jurisdiction

Personal jurisdiction is a court’s authority over a defendant in connection with particular claims. Because no federal statute supplied a different jurisdictional rule, the court applied California law and the federal constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs relied only on specific personal jurisdiction. That form of jurisdiction generally requires a defendant to deliberately conduct activities in the forum state and requires the claims to arise from or relate to those activities. Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, the court held that the claims of the out-of-state plaintiffs lacked the required connection to California. Suazo and Suart had worked in California, so their claims arose from Bluemercury’s California contacts. The complaint, however, did not show that the out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims were connected to California.

The court also rejected the argument that the FLSA’s collective-action procedure was intended to allow nationwide claims in any federal district. It noted that the FLSA does not authorize nationwide service of process and concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown why the Bristol-Myers limits should not apply.

Pendent Personal Jurisdiction

The plaintiffs alternatively asked the court to use pendent personal jurisdiction. That doctrine can allow jurisdiction over a related claim when the court already has jurisdiction over another claim arising from a common set of facts. The plaintiffs sought to extend that principle so that jurisdiction over one plaintiff’s claim would support jurisdiction over similar claims by other plaintiffs.

The court declined to recognize that extension, finding no support for it in the federal rules or statutes and concluding that it was difficult to reconcile with Bristol-Myers. The court added that dismissal would be warranted even if such jurisdiction were legally available because the record suggested that the plaintiffs were presenting the same personal-jurisdiction issue in different courts in hopes of obtaining a favorable result. The court viewed that as contrary to fair and efficient justice and as raising concerns about forum shopping and bad-faith litigation tactics.

Disposition

The court dismissed the claims of Ruben Bermudez, Gustavo Espinoza, Leyna Hanson, and Katherine Henriksen for lack of personal jurisdiction. The order did not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice, and it did not otherwise dispose of Suazo’s and Suart’s claims.