Foster v. United Continental Holdings, Inc.

Background

Nathaniel Foster Jr. was injured on February 8, 2019, during an assisted deboarding from United Airlines Flight 4193 at Monroe Regional Airport in Monroe, Louisiana. Foster was quadriplegic and needed a tracheal tube, ventilator, and power wheelchair. During deplaning, his tracheal tube was dislodged, and he was unable to breathe for a significant period. The opinion states that he remained in a coma and later describes him as being in a persistent vegetative state.

Foster’s mother Pamela, father Nathaniel Sr., and sister Natalie were also plaintiffs. The family sued United Airlines, Inc.; ExpressJet Airlines LLC, doing business as United Express; and DAL Global Services, LLC. The remaining claims were negligence and negligence per se against all defendants, breach of contract against United and ExpressJet, and negligent misrepresentation against United. United Airlines Holdings, Inc. had previously been dismissed because the operative complaint did not adequately allege an alter-ego claim.

The order addressed two issues: which state’s law governs certain damages questions, and what testimony aviation expert Daniel Mazzeo may give. The court stated that United’s separate motions for partial summary judgment would be addressed in another order.

Choice of law

Because the case was based on diversity jurisdiction, the court applied California’s choice-of-law rules. California uses a three-step “governmental interest” analysis: the court first determines whether the states’ laws differ, then considers each state’s interest in applying its own law, and finally compares which state’s interests would be more impaired if its law were not applied.

Punitive damages. California law allows punitive damages in a broader range of circumstances than Louisiana law. The defendants did not claim that one of Louisiana’s limited statutory exceptions for punitive damages applied. The court concluded that Louisiana did not have a legitimate interest in applying its punitive-damages restrictions here. In particular, the defendants did not claim Louisiana-domiciliary status or address the factors relevant to that status. The court therefore ruled that California law applies to punitive damages.

Apportionment of compensatory damages. California and Louisiana use different approaches to assigning responsibility for compensatory damages. California generally makes liability for economic damages joint and several, while limiting liability for noneconomic damages to a defendant’s proportionate share of fault. Louisiana uses a pure comparative-fault system that assigns percentages of fault to all responsible persons, including people or entities not involved in the lawsuit and the injured person.

The court found that Louisiana had a legitimate interest in applying its fault-allocation rules because the injury and much of the alleged misconduct occurred there, and because potential Louisiana tortfeasors could be part of the fault analysis. The court concluded that Louisiana’s interests would be more impaired by applying California law than California’s interests would be by applying Louisiana law. Louisiana law therefore applies to the apportionment of liability for compensatory damages.

Expert testimony

The plaintiffs asked the court to exclude Daniel Mazzeo’s testimony about whether the equipment used to deplane Foster complied with federal regulations. They argued that the case concerned operational negligence and inadequate training, not the equipment’s adequacy. The defendants responded that the complaint placed the equipment’s adequacy at issue.

The court ruled that an expert may address an ultimate factual issue, but may not testify in the form of a legal conclusion or advise the jury about the law. Mazzeo may discuss applicable aviation-safety standards and facts relevant to whether the defendants followed those standards. He may not offer conclusory opinions that the equipment complied with federal regulations.

Disposition

The court concluded that Louisiana law applies to apportionment of liability for compensatory damages. It also allowed Mazzeo to testify within the stated limits. The order did not decide United’s separate partial-summary-judgment motions.