Brown v. Broomfield

Background

Roy L. Brown, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by transferring 122 prisoners from the California Institution for Men, where there was a COVID-19 outbreak, to San Quentin State Prison on May 30, 2020. Brown alleged that San Quentin had poor ventilation and housing with open cell fronts, and that the defendants ignored safety measures. He alleged that he tested positive for COVID-19 on or about June 30, 2020.

Brown sued the defendants in both their individual and official capacities. The opinion identifies the defendants as Ron Broomfield, Ralph Diaz, Ron Davis, Kathleen Allison, J. Clark Kelso, Alison Pachynski, Clarence Cryer, Dean Borders, and Joseph Bick. Brown alleged that Kelso was responsible as a supervisor because he knew about the danger of transferring prisoners from a prison with a COVID-19 outbreak and failed to prevent the transfer.

Screening and Claims

Because Brown is a prisoner suing government officials, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. At this stage, the court had to identify claims that were legally viable and dismiss claims that failed to state a claim or sought monetary relief from an immune defendant. The court also applied the rule that a complaint must provide enough factual allegations to make a claim plausible, while construing a self-represented prisoner’s allegations liberally.

The court held that, when liberally construed, Brown’s allegations stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his safety against all defendants. Deliberate indifference means that a prison official knew a prisoner faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to reduce it. The court found the claims plausible based on the defendants’ described positions within the state corrections system or at the prisons involved.

Official-Capacity Damages

The court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment barred Brown’s claims for damages based on actions by the defendants in their official capacities. It therefore DISMISSED Brown’s claims for damages against the defendants in their official capacities. The opinion did not dismiss the described individual-capacity safety claims on that ground.

Service and Next Steps

The court ORDERED that service proceed through the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s electronic-service program for Ron Broomfield, Ralph Diaz, Ron Davis, Kathleen Allison, Alison Pachynski, L. Escobell, Clarence Cryer, Dean Borders, and Joseph Bick. It ordered that Clark Kelso be served separately through electronic service on him and his attorney. The order also directed the clerk and corrections department to handle waiver-of-service forms and directed defendants to cooperate with service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.

The court stated that it would issue a scheduling order for summary-judgment or other case-ending-motion briefing after resolution of common issues in another proceeding identified by docket number 22-mc-80066. Brown was directed to serve court communications on defense counsel, keep the court informed of address changes, prosecute the case, and comply with court deadlines. The court also stated that failure to prosecute could result in dismissal under Rule 41(b).

Disposition

This was a prisoner-complaint screening and service order. The court dismissed the official-capacity damages claims and ordered service on the remaining defendants as directed. Judge Edward J. Davila did not make a final determination of liability on the Eighth Amendment claim.