Dowdy v. Nam

Background

Vernon Dowdy, a state prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials at Salinas Valley State Prison. The court previously found that his complaint stated claims under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, against nurses Nam Tran, Francis Ssempebwa, and P. Guillen for allegedly failing to provide adequate medical care.

Dowdy injured his right hand on May 17, 2020, by slamming it onto a concrete table. He first sought medical care on May 18. The injury was later identified as a multiple-part fracture near the lower part of his pinky finger. Medical providers ordered an X-ray and prescribed pain medications, including acetaminophen, ibuprofen, a one-time dose of acetaminophen with codeine, and later other medications. Dowdy continued receiving care from prison and outside medical providers, and his finger was assessed as healed with normal hand function by December 2020.

Dowdy alleged that the defendant nurses failed to provide adequate pain medication during the days after his injury and humiliated him because of his drug addiction and withdrawal symptoms. He described encounters with Ssempebwa on or around May 18 and May 21, 2020, and with Guillen on May 19, 2020. The defendants disputed portions of his account. The court also noted that Dowdy’s records and testimony contained inconsistencies about the dates and events.

Before the defendants filed their motion, Dowdy’s claim against Tran was dismissed based on counsel’s formal suggestion of Tran’s death. The summary-judgment motion concerned Ssempebwa and Guillen.

Legal standard

Summary judgment is proper when the evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material if it could affect the result, and a dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the party opposing the motion.

For an Eighth Amendment medical-care claim, a prisoner must show a serious medical need and deliberate indifference. Deliberate indifference requires evidence that the official knew of a substantial risk of serious harm and consciously disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to address it. A disagreement between a prisoner and medical providers about the appropriate treatment generally is not enough. In a case involving different treatment options, the prisoner must show that the chosen treatment was medically unacceptable and was selected with conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health.

Ruling as to Ssempebwa

The court granted summary judgment on Dowdy’s claim against Ssempebwa. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Dowdy, the court considered Ssempebwa’s response to a May 18 “man down” call, the alleged response to another call on or about May 21, and Ssempebwa’s review of Dowdy’s May 22 health-care request.

The court reasoned that, by the evening of May 18, physicians had already evaluated Dowdy, ordered an X-ray, and prescribed pain medication. A nurse had reported that Dowdy’s vital signs and physical condition were within normal ranges, and Ssempebwa determined that Dowdy was not experiencing a medical emergency. The court also found that Dowdy had not shown Ssempebwa had authority to change or override the physicians’ prescriptions. The court concluded that Ssempebwa could not have caused the alleged injury of inadequate medication by failing to provide medication he lacked authority to prescribe.

The court stated that even if the alleged May 21 encounter occurred, the medical history showed that physicians had adjusted Dowdy’s medication by May 20, and Dowdy had not shown that Ssempebwa had authority or a clear medical basis to make further changes. The court also found no evidence that Ssempebwa’s review of Dowdy’s health-care request caused harm, noting that a face-to-face nursing visit was scheduled for May 26 but Dowdy refused to attend.

The court held that Dowdy had not shown a triable issue—that is, a factual dispute requiring a trial—about whether Ssempebwa knowingly disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm.

Ruling as to Guillen

The court also granted summary judgment on Dowdy’s claim against Guillen. Dowdy’s allegations against Guillen concerned an alleged May 19 response to a “man down” call. Guillen stated that he was assigned to a different building that day and did not recall the interaction. The court found that Dowdy had not offered sufficiently probative evidence to persuade a reasonable fact-finder that the encounter occurred.

The court added that, even assuming the encounter occurred as Dowdy alleged, Dowdy had not shown that Guillen caused actual harm or knowingly disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. The physicians had already prescribed pain medication, and the record did not show that Guillen could have provided different medication that would have better addressed Dowdy’s pain.

Other defenses and disposition

The defendants also argued that qualified immunity protected them from liability for civil damages and that the Eleventh Amendment barred damages claims against them in their official capacities. The court did not reach either argument because it granted summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claims on other grounds.

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It dismissed Dowdy’s claims against Ssempebwa and Guillen with prejudice, directed the clerk to enter judgment and close the file, and terminated the motion at Docket No. 32.