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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled May 22, 2023

Humphrey v. The J.M. Smucker Company

Judge
William Orrick
Docket
3:22-cv-06913
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
16
Civil ProcedureMotion to DismissClass ActionTort
In one sentence

Humphrey v. Smucker: Judge Orrick granted in part and denied in part Smucker’s dismissal motion, dismissing multi-state subclass claims with leave to amend.

Who this affects

Robin Humphrey’s individual claims and the California class claims may proceed; claims for consumers in the nine other states were dismissed with leave to amend.

What happened

In Humphrey v. The J.M. Smucker Company, Robin Humphrey alleged that Smucker falsely marketed 9Lives, Kibbles ‘n Bits, and Meow Mix pet food as healthy despite alleged titanium dioxide and PFAS concerns.

The court found that Humphrey adequately alleged her own economic injury because she said she bought the products relying on their health-related statements. But she lacked standing to represent consumers in nine other states because she alleged no injury, residence, or other relevant connection to those states. The court dismissed the multi-state subclass claims with leave to amend, while allowing the remaining claims to proceed.

Judge William H. Orrick also rejected Smucker’s arguments that the health-related statements were too vague or that the negligent-misrepresentation claim required physical harm or a business purchase. The motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part, and any amended complaint was due within 20 days.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Humphrey v. The J.M. Smucker Company · No. 3:22-cv-06913
Judge
William Orrick
Date
May 22, 2023

Background

Robin Humphrey brought a putative class action against The J.M. Smucker Company concerning three pet-food brands: 9Lives, Kibbles ‘n Bits, and Meow Mix. Humphrey alleged that Smucker represented the products as healthy for cats and dogs even though the food allegedly contained titanium dioxide and the packaging contained, or risked containing, per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, known as PFAS. She alleged that she relied on statements such as “100% Complete & Balanced Nutrition,” “Helps Support a Healthy Immune System,” “healthy skin & coat,” and “balanced nourishment in every bite!” when purchasing the products.

The First Amended Complaint asserted 10 claims, including violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Consumers Legal Remedies Act, and False Advertising Law, as well as inducement, fraudulent concealment or omission, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. Humphrey sought to represent a California class and a multi-state subclass covering consumers who purchased the products in California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, or Washington.

Smucker moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Standing and the Multi-State Subclass

The court rejected Smucker’s argument that Humphrey had merely pleaded a product-defect case rather than a false-advertising case. The court treated the complaint as alleging that Smucker’s health-related representations were misleading because of the alleged titanium dioxide and PFAS risks.

The court held that Humphrey adequately alleged an injury for purposes of individual standing. She alleged that she spent money on products she would not have purchased if she had known the alleged facts about their contents. The court described this alleged overpayment as an economic injury sufficient to support standing at the pleading stage.

The court reached a different conclusion concerning the multi-state subclass. Humphrey alleged no injury, residence, or other pertinent connection to the nine states other than California. The court therefore dismissed Claim 10, which asserted violations of those states’ consumer-fraud laws, with leave to amend. The court gave Humphrey an opportunity to identify other plaintiffs who could support those claims.

Alleged Misrepresentations

The court rejected Smucker’s argument that the challenged statements were non-actionable puffery. Puffery means generalized praise or opinion that ordinarily cannot be proved true or false. The court concluded that the statements, viewed in the context of the packaging as a whole, plausibly conveyed specific and measurable facts about the products’ healthfulness and could be proved false under Humphrey’s theory.

The court also rejected Smucker’s argument that Humphrey failed to connect the alleged titanium dioxide and PFAS risks to statements about muscles, heart health, vision, skin, coat, weight, digestion, and metabolism. The complaint alleged health effects that plausibly related to those representations. Because Smucker offered no other argument against the Unfair Competition Law, Consumers Legal Remedies Act, and False Advertising Law claims, those claims could proceed.

Negligent Misrepresentation

Smucker argued that Humphrey’s negligent-misrepresentation claim failed because she did not allege physical harm or that she bought the products for a business purpose. The court was not persuaded. It explained that the elements of negligent misrepresentation include a misrepresentation of a material past or existing fact, lack of reasonable grounds for believing it true, intent to induce reliance, justifiable reliance, and resulting damage.

The court found it unclear whether the authority cited by Smucker imposed the requirements it asserted in a consumer false-advertising case. It also concluded that, even under Smucker’s proposed standard, the alleged statements appeared to have been made in a commercial setting for Smucker’s financial interest in selling the products. The court therefore declined to dismiss the negligent-misrepresentation claim at that stage.

Disposition

The court’s conclusion states that the motion to dismiss was DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, with leave to amend the claims asserted on behalf of the multi-state subclass. The court also stated that any amended complaint was due within 20 days of the order’s issuance. Judge William H. Orrick reset the case-management conference for June 13, 2023, and required a joint case-management statement by June 6, 2023.

The authoritative version

Read the full 16-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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