Coalition on Homelessness v. City and County of San Francisco
- Donna Ryu
- 4:22-cv-05502
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 7
In Coalition on Homelessness v. City and County of San Francisco, Judge Ryu denied standing dismissal but granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion.
The ruling preserved the individual plaintiffs’ participation against the standing challenge, addressed the defendants’ objections to allegations about London Breed and Sam Dodge, and required the plaintiffs to prepare and file a second amended complaint.
What happened
Coalition on Homelessness v. City and County of San Francisco concerns a civil-rights lawsuit by the Coalition on Homelessness and several current or formerly homeless San Francisco residents. They challenge alleged enforcement against unhoused people who lack shelter and the alleged seizure and destruction of their belongings.
The defendants asked the court to dismiss certain individual plaintiffs for lack of constitutional standing to seek court orders preventing future harm. They also asked the court to dismiss or strike factual allegations about former defendants London Breed and Sam Dodge, arguing those allegations exceeded the permission previously given to amend the complaint.
Judge Ryu denied the request to dismiss the individual plaintiffs for lack of standing and ruled that the overall motion was granted in part and denied in part. The court ordered the plaintiffs to provide a proposed second amended complaint within seven days and file it within 14 days of the order.
The detailed version
- Coalition on Homelessness v. City and County of San Francisco · No. 4:22-cv-05502
- Donna Ryu
- May 23, 2023
Background
The Coalition on Homelessness, a nonprofit advocacy organization, and individual plaintiffs Toro Castaño, Sarah Cronk, Joshua Donohoe, Molique Frank, David Martinez, Teresa Sandoval, and Nathaniel Vaughn sued the City and County of San Francisco, several San Francisco departments, and other defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The complaint challenges alleged practices of citing, fining, arresting, or threatening to arrest unsheltered people to make them leave public sidewalks and parks when no adequate shelter is available. It also challenges the alleged seizure and destruction of personal property and survival belongings without adequate notice or an opportunity to recover them.
The plaintiffs previously received permission to amend their complaint to add claims against London Breed and Sam Dodge in their individual capacities. The first amended complaint did not assert claims against Breed or Dodge in either individual or official capacities, but it added factual allegations about their alleged involvement in the challenged conduct.
Motion to Dismiss Individual Plaintiffs
The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which permits dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. They argued that Sandoval, Martinez, Cronk, and Donohoe lacked standing to seek relief under the Eighth Amendment and Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution because they did not allege that they had been cited, arrested, or prosecuted for involuntary homelessness. They also argued that Vaughn, Castaño, and Frank lacked standing for all claims because they were no longer homeless and therefore were not at imminent risk of the challenged conduct.
The court explained that standing requires an injury that is actual or imminent, connected to the defendant’s conduct, and likely to be remedied by a favorable ruling. For injunctive relief—an order requiring or forbidding future conduct—a plaintiff must show a real and immediate threat of being harmed again. The court also noted that, under Ninth Circuit precedent, it generally need not decide every individual plaintiff’s standing when one plaintiff has standing.
The court held that the Coalition on Homelessness unquestionably had standing to seek all forms of relief requested in the case, including declaratory, injunctive, and mandate relief, as well as fees and costs. Based on that conclusion, the court did not reach the defendants’ standing arguments concerning the individual plaintiffs and denied the motion to dismiss them for lack of Article III standing.
Motion to Strike Factual Allegations
The defendants also moved under Rule 12(f), which allows a court to remove from a pleading matter that is redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. They challenged paragraphs containing allegations about Breed and Dodge, arguing that the allegations went beyond the scope of the earlier permission to amend because the first amended complaint did not add claims against them in their individual capacities.
The court found that some challenged allegations were similar or identical to allegations in the original complaint. Other challenged allegations added information about Breed’s alleged involvement in sweeps, directions to San Francisco officials concerning particular homeless individuals, and alleged motivations for those actions. The court concluded that the first amended complaint did not assert claims against Breed or Dodge in any capacity and directed the plaintiffs to provide a proposed second amended complaint consistent with the order. The opinion text provided here does not clearly state the court’s separate disposition of each challenged paragraph, but its conclusion states that the defendants’ motion was granted in part and denied in part.
Order
The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. It ordered the plaintiffs to provide the defendants with a proposed second amended complaint within seven days, meet and confer about the proposed deletions, and file the second amended complaint within 14 days of the order. Judge Donna Ryu issued the order on May 23, 2023.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.