Smith v. Santa Cruz County

Background

This case arises from Tamario Smith’s death on May 10, 2020, while he was detained at the Santa Cruz County Jail. Smith’s parents, Felicia Smith and Michael Warren-Smith, filed the action on behalf of Smith and as his co-successors in interest. The operative Third Amended Complaint asserts claims under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; California’s wrongful-death statute; the Americans with Disabilities Act; the Rehabilitation Act; and common-law negligence.

The complaint alleges that Dr. Gerald Lazar, a psychiatrist contracted by Santa Cruz County to provide psychiatric services to people detained at the jail, treated Smith and prescribed medication during Smith’s incarceration. The plaintiffs allege that Dr. Lazar and other defendants intentionally failed to provide adequate mental-health services to Smith, who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia.

The plaintiffs served Dr. Lazar with the Third Amended Complaint by substitute service on February 14, 2022. Dr. Lazar later emailed plaintiffs’ counsel that he had received a summons but would be outside the country until mid-April. The plaintiffs’ counsel recommended that he contact an attorney so he could respond on time. After Dr. Lazar failed to respond, the clerk entered default against him on March 16, 2022. No default judgment had been entered.

Dr. Lazar moved to set aside the entry of default on December 30, 2022. He stated that he was retired from practicing psychiatry, was traveling outside the country when served, did not understand the nature of the documents described to him by a friend, and mistakenly believed that the County or the medical group for which he had worked would handle the matter. He also stated that he did not review the papers after returning home because they were under other papers and that he was not served with the application for default or the entry of default. His professional liability insurer later retained counsel for him.

Legal standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), a court may set aside an entry of default for “good cause.” The court considered three factors: whether Dr. Lazar engaged in culpable conduct that caused the default, whether he had a potentially valid defense, and whether setting aside the default would prejudice the plaintiffs.

The court also emphasized that default judgment is a drastic remedy and that cases should generally be decided on their merits when possible.

Court’s analysis

The court found that Dr. Lazar’s failure to respond was neglectful, but not intentional in the legally relevant sense. The court credited his sworn explanation and found no evidence that he acted maliciously, in bad faith, or to interfere with the plaintiffs’ case or the judicial process. The court therefore concluded that he had not engaged in culpable conduct for purposes of the motion.

The court held that Dr. Lazar met the minimal burden of showing a potentially valid defense. He submitted a proposed motion arguing that the claims against him should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court expressly did not decide whether those arguments would succeed because the proposed motion had not yet been filed as an actual motion.

The court found no sufficient prejudice to the plaintiffs. Because there was no default judgment and the case had not progressed to the point where a judgment had to be reopened, the court said the possible prejudice was reduced. The plaintiffs identified delay, litigation expenses, the need to include Dr. Lazar in discovery, and concerns about fading memories and lost evidence. The court concluded that ordinary litigation costs and delay were not enough, and that the plaintiffs had not identified specific evidence loss or other harm that would impair their ability to pursue the case.

Disposition

The court GRANTED Dr. Lazar’s motion to set aside default. It ordered him to file a response to the Third Amended Complaint within seven days of the order’s entry. It VACATED the trial-setting conference scheduled for June 1, 2023, and ordered the parties to meet and confer within two weeks and propose a revised case-management schedule, including any needed extension of fact discovery concerning Dr. Lazar. The order did not decide the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims or Dr. Lazar’s proposed arguments for dismissal.