Brown v. Campbell

Background

Michael Brown, who was incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison, filed a petition asking the federal court to review his state-court conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. An Alameda County jury found him guilty of forcible oral copulation, and he received an eight-year prison sentence. Brown represented himself in this federal action. Respondent Tammy Campbell filed an answer, and Brown did not file a response to that answer.

On direct appeal, Brown raised claims that his trial lawyer was ineffective for allowing Juror No. A11 to remain on the jury, that the prosecutor committed misconduct, that the trial court improperly limited impeachment evidence, that the jury instructions were improper, and that these errors were cumulative. He did not separately argue that Juror No. A11’s presence violated his federal right to an impartial jury, and he did not raise a claim under California’s Racial Justice Act. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, and the California Supreme Court summarily denied review.

Exhaustion and Cognizability

Before a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas review, the prisoner generally must give the state courts a fair opportunity to decide each federal claim. The court explained that Brown’s claim that Juror No. A11 was biased was different from his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek the juror’s removal. Raising the ineffective-assistance claim did not fairly present the underlying juror-bias claim to the state courts. The court therefore found that Brown had not exhausted state remedies for the juror-bias claim.

The court also noted that Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim had found three claims cognizable: denial of an impartial jury, prosecutorial misconduct, and evidentiary and instructional errors. Magistrate Judge Kim had not found Brown’s California Racial Justice Act claim cognizable. The court described the petition as containing exhausted and unexhausted claims.

Order Requiring an Election

Because dismissing the petition immediately could create a statute-of-limitations problem for a later federal petition, the court did not immediately dismiss the action. Instead, it ordered Brown to file a notice within 28 days choosing one of three options:

The court explained that a stay would require Brown to address the requirements identified in Rhines v. Weber, including good cause for the failure to exhaust, that the claims are not meritless, and that he was not intentionally delaying the case. If Brown failed to select an option or file the required motion by the deadline, the court stated that it would dismiss the unexhausted juror-bias claim, dismiss the non-cognizable Racial Justice Act claim, and address the three remaining claims on their merits.

Disposition and Classification

The court ordered Brown to make an election; it did not decide the merits of his habeas claims in this order. This is a procedural order because it addressed exhaustion and cognizability rather than whether Brown was entitled to habeas relief.