Rivera v. Broomfield

Background

A California jury convicted Rivera of multiple sex offenses involving J.L. and B.T., including offenses against minors, and sentenced him to a total of 40 years in state prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, and the California Supreme Court declined to review it.

Rivera filed this federal petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which allows a state prisoner to challenge custody that violates federal law. The operative petition raised one claim: that his right to due process was violated when the jury received CALCRIM No. 1193 concerning expert testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, or CSAAS. The instruction told jurors that the expert’s testimony was not evidence that Rivera committed the charged crimes and could be used only to decide whether J.L.’s conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone who had been abused and to evaluate her credibility.

Arguments and Analysis

Rivera argued that the instruction was misleading because jurors could not use CSAAS testimony to evaluate J.L.’s credibility without also using it to decide whether her abuse allegations were true. He also argued that the instruction’s reference to “the crimes charged” allowed jurors to use the testimony as proof that he committed uncharged offenses and then infer that he committed the charged offenses. He contended that these problems reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof and violated due process.

The court reviewed the claim under the federal standard governing challenges to state convictions. Under that standard, relief is available only when the state court’s decision conflicts with clearly established United States Supreme Court law or rests on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Jury instructions must be considered as a whole, and an instruction warrants relief only if it created a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied it in a constitutionally improper way and the error substantially affected the verdict.

The court rejected Rivera’s arguments. It explained that the California courts had interpreted CALCRIM No. 1193 as allowing CSAAS testimony only to counter assumptions that a victim’s behavior—such as delayed or apparently inconsistent reporting—meant the victim was lying. The testimony could not be used to prove that abuse occurred. The federal court was required to follow the state court’s interpretation of state law. The court also relied on the presumption that jurors follow their instructions, the expert’s testimony that CSAAS was an educational tool rather than proof that a particular person had been abused, the prosecution’s limited use of the testimony, and other instructions requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Rivera raised additional challenges in his response, including arguments about insufficient evidence, false evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and limits on the defense’s presentation of evidence. The court declined to address those arguments because they were not included in the operative petition and had not been presented to the California Supreme Court. The court also noted that the arguments were too conclusory to support federal relief.

Ruling

The court held that the state court’s rejection of Rivera’s jury-instruction claim was neither contrary to clearly established federal law nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. denied the petition.

The court also denied a certificate of appealability, finding that Rivera had not made the required substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied. It entered judgment in favor of Broomfield and directed the Clerk to close the case.