Spath v. County of Santa Clara
- Laurel Beeler
- 3:22-cv-07599
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 14
In Spath v. County of Santa Clara, Judge Corley granted the County’s dismissal motion against three claims and deferred amendment of a fourth.
Noah Spath’s Bane Act, negligence, and medical-negligence claims were dismissed without leave to amend. Tim Spath’s emotional-distress claim was dismissed at this stage, but the court had not yet decided whether the plaintiffs could amend it. Santa Clara County prevailed on the motion addressed by the order.
What happened
In Spath v. County of Santa Clara, Noah Spath and his father, Tim Spath, sued Santa Clara County over Noah’s involuntary mental-health treatment during a crisis. The County asked the court to dismiss four claims for not adequately stating a legal claim.
The court dismissed Noah’s claims under California’s Bane Act, negligence law, and the state medical-negligence statute, without allowing amendment. It ruled that government immunities barred those claims. The court also granted dismissal of Tim’s claim for emotional distress, because he did not witness the event that caused Noah’s injury, but it deferred whether the plaintiffs may amend that claim.
Judge Corley’s order therefore granted the County’s motion as to counts three, four, and five, and granted it as to count six while deferring the question of leave to amend count six. The order did not decide whether Tim will ultimately be allowed to amend that claim.
The detailed version
- Spath v. County of Santa Clara · No. 3:22-cv-07599
- Laurel Beeler
- July 7, 2023
Background
Noah Spath and his father, Tim Spath, brought claims arising from involuntary treatment Noah received during a mental-health crisis. Santa Clara County moved under Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state enough facts to make a legal claim plausible. The order addressed counts three, four, five, and six of the First Amended Complaint.
Count Six: Tim’s Negligent-Infliction-of-Emotional-Distress Claim
Tim based his claim on hearing Noah’s voicemail after Noah left the hospital. Under California law, a bystander claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress generally must be closely related to the injured person, must be present during the injury-producing event and contemporaneously aware that it is causing injury, and must suffer serious emotional distress.
The court held that Noah’s injury occurred when he fell. Because Tim did not observe Noah’s fall, listening to the voicemail did not satisfy the requirement that he contemporaneously perceive the injury-producing event. The court therefore granted the County’s motion as to count six. It deferred whether to allow amendment, asking the plaintiffs to submit a brief explaining why they should be allowed to amend that claim and allowing the County to respond.
Count Three: Noah’s Bane Act Claim
The County argued that the California Bane Act does not permit a claim directly against a municipality. The court denied the motion on that ground because Noah alleged the claim against specific County employees and alleged that the County could be held responsible for those employees’ conduct as their employer.
The court nevertheless concluded that Noah’s Bane Act claim was barred in whole by California Government Code section 854.8, which generally protects public entities from liability for injuries to an inpatient of a mental institution. The court also explained that section 856.2 protected the County from liability for injuries Noah suffered while escaping or after escaping, although that immunity did not bar the portion of counts three through five based on events before the escape.
Counts Four and Five: Negligence and Medical Negligence
The County argued that California Government Code section 815 barred the plaintiffs’ nonstatutory claims. The court denied that argument because section 815.2 can make a public entity liable for injuries caused by an employee acting within the scope of employment when a valid claim could be brought against the employee, and the complaint alleged that County employees acted within that scope.
The court held, however, that section 854.8 barred Noah’s negligence and medical-negligence claims in whole. The plaintiffs relied on California Government Code section 855, which can create liability for injuries caused by a public medical facility’s failure to meet specific statutory or regulatory minimum standards for equipment, personnel, or facilities. The court found that the cited provisions—including California Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5150 and 5325.1, several federal healthcare regulations, and a state handbook—either stated general goals or did not allege a violation involving Noah, and therefore did not establish section 855 liability. The court also found that proposed reliance on other provisions and on a general medical standard of care would not cure the problem.
Disposition
The court granted the County’s motion to dismiss counts three, four, and five without leave to amend. It also granted the motion as to count six, while deferring whether the plaintiffs may amend count six. The conclusion states that the County’s motion was granted and that the order disposed of the motion docket entry.
Judge
The opinion is signed by Jacqueline Scott Corley, United States District Judge.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.