Brinson v. Garland

Background

Brad Daniel Brinson sued Merrick B. Garland, the United States Attorney General, and California Attorney General Bonta in their official capacities. Brinson alleged that officials denied him firearm purchases because of his 1997 conviction under California Penal Code § 243(e) for battery against a woman with whom he had a dating relationship. He alleged that the conviction did not qualify as a federal misdemeanor crime of domestic violence that barred him from possessing or receiving firearms.

Brinson alleged that he was denied a firearm purchase in 2014, but that attorneys for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the California Department of Justice later confirmed that the conviction did not prohibit him from possessing firearms. He said he was able to purchase firearms until another denial in 2018. He also alleged that a 2022 Federal Bureau of Investigation letter denied his administrative appeal because the agency considered him prohibited from possessing firearms.

Brinson brought claims under 18 U.S.C. § 925A for an erroneous firearm denial, the Second Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. He sought declarations and injunctions. Garland moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint plausibly alleges a legally valid claim.

Firearm-denial claim

The court denied Garland’s request to dismiss Brinson’s claim under 18 U.S.C. § 925A. That statute permits a person denied a firearm because of erroneous information to sue the entity responsible for the denial. The court explained that Brinson needed to plausibly allege that he was denied a firearm transfer by Garland because of erroneous information.

The court found those allegations sufficient. The 2022 Federal Bureau of Investigation letter linked the denial to Brinson’s 1997 conviction, and Brinson alleged that he had no other conviction that would prohibit firearm possession. His complaint also included a 2014 email from a Federal Bureau of Investigation attorney stating that his dating relationship with the victim did not qualify the conviction as a federal misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under the law then in effect. A California Department of Justice attorney had confirmed that determination, and Brinson alleged that he subsequently purchased firearms for several years.

Garland argued that records from Santa Cruz County showed Brinson had cohabited with the victim, which could have made the conviction disqualifying under federal law. The court declined to incorporate those records into the complaint or take judicial notice of them because Brinson had not relied on them, their contents were subject to reasonable dispute, and they would have been used to dispute the complaint’s factual allegations. The court also stated that the portions Garland relied on were hearsay and that factual disputes could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

Constitutional claims

The court dismissed Brinson’s Second Amendment and Equal Protection claims with leave to amend. The court explained that Brinson was not challenging the constitutionality of the federal firearm prohibition itself; instead, he alleged that officials incorrectly treated him as subject to that prohibition.

The court further held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not a proper cause of action against Garland, a federal officer sued for conduct under federal law. Brinson’s complaint did not allege that Garland conspired with Bonta to violate his civil rights under state law. Because the complaint did not allege facts permitting Brinson to pursue § 1983 claims against Garland, the constitutional claims were insufficiently pleaded.

Disposition

Judge Corley granted in part and denied in part Garland’s motion to dismiss with leave to amend. The erroneous-firearm-denial claim was sufficiently pleaded, while the constitutional claims were dismissed with leave to amend. The court stated that the deadline for amending would be discussed at the upcoming case-management conference. The court also granted the administrative motion to seal and stated that the order disposed of Docket Nos. 27 and 28.