Bryan v. Del Monte Foods, Inc.

Background

Kerstine Bryan alleged that she purchased Del Monte’s Mango Chunks and Peach Chunks fruit cups after seeing the words “fruit naturals” prominently displayed on their front labels. She alleged that she understood that phrase to mean the products contained only natural ingredients, but that the products contained synthetic ingredients, including citric acid, potassium sorbate, sodium benzoate, and methylcellulose gum. She brought claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising Law, Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act, unjust enrichment, and various state consumer-protection statutes, on her own behalf and for proposed classes.

Del Monte moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that Bryan lacked Article III standing, and under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that she failed to state legally sufficient claims.

Standing

The court rejected Del Monte’s argument that Bryan had not alleged an economic injury. Bryan alleged that she purchased the products, purchased more of them, or paid more for them because of Del Monte’s representations that they were natural. The court held those allegations sufficient to plead an injury in fact and causation for Article III standing.

The court agreed, however, that Bryan had not alleged a sufficient future injury to seek an injunction. Bryan conceded that point, and the court granted dismissal to the extent she sought injunctive relief.

The court also held that Bryan, the only named plaintiff, lacked standing to assert claims under the laws of eleven states other than California and Oregon because she alleged that she lived in Oregon and did not allege purchases or other relevant interactions in those states. The court granted dismissal of those portions of Count V.

As to products Bryan did not purchase, the court held that she adequately alleged standing for five identified products because they were the same type of food, used the same “fruit naturals” labeling, and involved the same alleged injury as the products she purchased. The court granted dismissal of claims involving products that Bryan did not identify meaningfully.

Failure to State a Claim

The court rejected Del Monte’s argument that the consumer-protection claims failed the reasonable-consumer test. It held that a reasonable consumer could plausibly understand “fruit naturals” to mean that the products contained no synthetic ingredients. The references to light syrup and the ingredient list did not require dismissal because, at the pleading stage, consumers are not expected to look beyond a misleading front-label representation to find contrary information in a small-print ingredient list.

The court also held that Bryan’s claims for identified products satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires fraud allegations to identify the misconduct’s who, what, when, where, and how. Bryan identified Del Monte as the manufacturer and marketer, identified the products she purchased, described the “fruit naturals” representation, alleged when and where she made a purchase, and alleged that she relied on the representation. The court agreed, however, that the allegations concerning unidentified products were too vague to give Del Monte adequate notice.

The court declined to dismiss the California Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising Law claims merely because Bryan alleged purchases in Oregon. It held that her allegations that Del Monte operated from California and disseminated the challenged representations from there were sufficient at this stage.

The court also declined to dismiss Bryan’s Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act claim for failure to allege a willful violation. Bryan alleged facts supporting an inference that Del Monte knew the products contained synthetic ingredients while emphasizing their purported natural composition.

The court dismissed Bryan’s unjust-enrichment claim. Although it construed the claim as an equitable restitution claim, it held that Bryan had not plausibly alleged that she lacked an adequate remedy at law.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part Del Monte’s motion to dismiss. It granted the motion as to injunctive relief, Count V claims under the laws of states other than California or Oregon, claims based on unidentified products, and the unjust-enrichment claim. It denied dismissal of the remaining claims addressed in the order. The court granted Bryan leave to amend because amendment was not necessarily futile. Any amended complaint was due by August 25, 2023; if Bryan did not amend, the action would proceed on the remaining claims in the original complaint. Judge Maxine M. Chesney signed the order.