Bess v. Peffley
- Jacquelyn Corley
- 3:22-cv-00341
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 16
In Bess v. Peffley, Judge Corley granted in part and denied in part Peffley’s summary-judgment motion, granted Bess’s sur-reply request, and stayed the case for mediation.
Daniel Bess’s remaining constitutional claims against J. Peffley may proceed after summary judgment. The ruling removed only the First Amendment retaliation theory based on Bess’s refusal to become a prison informant; the case was stayed for prisoner mediation.
What happened
In Bess v. Peffley, Daniel Bess, a California prisoner without a lawyer, sued Sergeant J. Peffley under a federal civil-rights law. Bess claimed Peffley threatened to identify him as a prison informant, falsely label him as involved with a security threat group, and interfere with his parole after Bess refused to provide information and said he would file a grievance.
The court found that Bess’s grievance adequately exhausted his claim that Peffley tried to put him in danger by pressuring him to become an informant. It also found enough evidence for a trial on Bess’s claim that Peffley retaliated against him for saying he intended to file a grievance. But the court rejected the separate retaliation theory based on Bess’s refusal to become an informant, because that refusal was not protected conduct for a retaliation claim.
Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley granted in part and denied in part Peffley’s summary-judgment motion, granted Bess’s request to file a sur-reply, and denied qualified immunity on the remaining claims. The court referred the case to a prisoner mediation program and stayed further proceedings during mediation, except for mediation-related matters.
The detailed version
- Bess v. Peffley · No. 3:22-cv-00341
- Jacquelyn Corley
- Aug. 2, 2023
Background
Daniel Bess, a California prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against J. Peffley, who was a sergeant in the Institutional Services Unit at the California Training Facility when the events occurred. Peffley searched Bess’s cell on February 4, 2021. The parties disputed whether the search uncovered altered tablets and prohibited cellphone accessories. Bess said Peffley also asked him to provide information about security threat group activity in front of other inmates.
According to Bess, he refused and said he would file a grievance. Bess alleged that Peffley then threatened to validate him as a security threat group member, tell other inmates that he was a “snitch,” and place confidential reports in his prison file that could harm his upcoming parole hearing. Two confidential memoranda appeared in Bess’s central prison file several days later. Peffley denied involvement in preparing or placing those memoranda, and other officials stated that they—not Peffley—participated in preparing, approving, and filing them.
Bess filed an administrative grievance on April 11, 2021. The prison’s first-level review denied it, and the second-level appeal was treated as exhausted after the response period expired. Peffley argued that Bess had not exhausted his Eighth Amendment claim because the grievance did not identify that legal theory. Bess also filed a motion to submit a sur-reply, meaning an additional response to the reply brief.
Claims and Analysis
Bess asserted two related theories. First, he claimed that Peffley violated the Eighth Amendment by trying to force him into the dangerous position of being a prison informant and threatening serious consequences if he refused. Second, he claimed that Peffley retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment for refusing to become an informant and for expressing his intent to file a grievance.
The court rejected Peffley’s exhaustion argument. It held that Bess’s grievance described who allegedly acted, when the conduct occurred, the request for information, the threats concerning his prison file and parole, and the danger associated with becoming an informant. The grievance did not need to use the words “Eighth Amendment” or “deliberate indifference.” The court concluded that Bess exhausted the Eighth Amendment claim.
On the retaliation claim, the court held that threats to label Bess a “snitch,” validate him as a security threat group member, or place false memoranda in his file could qualify as adverse action because threats alone may deter an ordinary person from exercising constitutional rights. The timing of the alleged threats and the appearance of the memoranda created factual disputes about whether the conduct was retaliatory and whether Peffley was involved.
The court distinguished between Bess’s two alleged forms of protected conduct. It held that refusing to become a “snitch” was not protected conduct supporting a First Amendment retaliation claim. It held, however, that expressing an intent to file a prison grievance was protected conduct. Because factual disputes remained about the retaliation claim based on that expression, summary judgment was denied on that theory.
The court also rejected Peffley’s qualified-immunity argument on the Eighth Amendment claim. Qualified immunity can protect a government official from liability unless the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. The court concluded that precedent clearly established that pressuring a prisoner to become an informant by threatening significant harm if he refused could violate the Eighth Amendment, even if the threatened harm had not yet fully occurred. Peffley did not assert qualified immunity on the retaliation theory based on Bess’s intent to file a grievance.
Disposition
The court granted in part and denied in part Peffley’s motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment was granted on the portion of Bess’s First Amendment retaliation claim based on his refusal to become an informant. Summary judgment was denied on Bess’s remaining claims, including the Eighth Amendment claim and the retaliation claim based on his stated intent to file a grievance.
Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley granted Bess’s motion to file a sur-reply. The court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Illman through the Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program and stayed further proceedings until further order, except for proceedings related to mediation. The mediation was to occur within 120 days of the order, and the mediation proceedings were to remain confidential.
Read the full 16-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.