Johnson v. Meta Platforms, Inc.

Background

Tiara N. Johnson sued Meta Platforms, Inc. over the disabling of her Instagram account, which she had used to promote and sell “fine adult toys.” She also alleged that Meta allowed other users to create imitation accounts claiming to be her and violating her trademark. Her amended complaint asserted four claims against Meta: breach of contract, tortious interference with prospective economic relations, federal trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114, and federal unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The complaint also asserted a claim against John Doe, but the court dismissed that defendant in a separate order after Johnson did not respond to an order concerning service of process.

Meta moved to dismiss the claims against it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally sufficient claim. Johnson did not oppose the motion. The court declined to treat that failure alone as consent to dismissal or abandonment of her claims, because the Northern District of California’s local rules do not provide that failing to oppose a motion to dismiss automatically justifies granting it. Instead, the court evaluated the claims under the normal pleading standard.

Claims Against Meta

Breach of contract

Johnson identified Instagram’s Terms of Use as the contract and alleged that Meta breached it by disabling her account and allowing imitation accounts. The court held that she did not identify any specific contractual provision that Meta breached. The Terms of Use expressly allowed Meta to disable or terminate an account in several circumstances. The court also noted that the Terms of Use appeared to bar recovery of lost profits and certain other damages. The motion to dismiss was granted as to this claim.

Tortious interference with prospective economic relations

Johnson alleged that disabling her account interfered with relationships involving 2 Trill Promotions, LLC and others. The court held that she did not allege facts showing Meta knew about particular economic relationships; alleging only that Meta knew the account was used for business was insufficient. The court also held that she did not identify facts showing that Meta’s conduct was independently wrongful under some legal standard beyond the interference itself. The motion to dismiss was granted as to this claim.

Federal trademark infringement

Johnson alleged that she owned the trademark KAKEYTAUGHTME. The trademark document considered by the court listed Tiara Welch as the owner, and the amended complaint did not explain who Tiara Welch was or how Johnson claimed ownership of a mark registered to that person. The court also held that Johnson did not allege that Meta itself used her mark or a confusingly similar mark in commerce. Allegations that third-party Instagram users used the mark were not enough to establish Meta’s liability. Her allegations of contributory infringement—claiming that Meta enabled or failed to stop third-party infringement—were conclusory and lacked factual support for Meta’s knowledge or control. The court further held that she did not adequately allege likely consumer confusion. The motion to dismiss was granted as to this claim.

Federal unfair competition

The court explained that the elements of federal unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) are generally the same as those for trademark infringement, although the statute also covers unregistered marks, trade dress, false advertising, and product disparagement. Because Johnson’s trademark-infringement allegations were deficient, the court dismissed the unfair-competition claim as well. The motion to dismiss was granted as to this claim.

Section 230 and Amendment

Meta argued that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act would provide immunity even if Johnson had adequately pleaded her contract and interference claims. The court did not decide that issue because it had already found those claims inadequately pleaded.

The court considered whether Johnson should be allowed to amend. It found no undue delay, bad faith, repeated failure to correct deficiencies, or undue prejudice to Meta. However, it concluded that amendment would be futile because the defects went to the core of the claims, Johnson had not opposed the motion, and nothing in the record suggested that additional allegations could cure the problems.

Disposition

Judge Beth Labson Freeman ordered that Meta’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint be granted without leave to amend and that the action be dismissed with prejudice. The court stated that a separate judgment would be entered.