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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Aug. 23, 2023

Zhang v. Twitter Inc.

Judge
Jacquelyn Corley
Docket
3:23-cv-00980
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
13
Civil ProcedureMotion to DismissContractPro Se
In one sentence

In Zhang v. Twitter Inc., Judge Corley dismissed Zhang’s amended complaint, finding federal internet-content law barred his claims and amendment futile.

Who this affects

Taiming Zhang’s claims against Twitter, Inc., including claims arising from Twitter’s suspension of his account and its handling of another user’s account and content.

What happened

In Zhang v. Twitter Inc., Taiming Zhang, representing himself, sued Twitter after it permanently suspended his account in 2021. He sought damages and alleged claims involving contract, fraud, emotional distress, assault, defamation, privacy, criminal statutes, and California’s unfair-competition law.

The court held that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act protected Twitter from claims based on its decisions about Zhang’s account, another user’s account, and content posted by users. The court also said that, even without that protection, Zhang had not pleaded enough facts to state a legally plausible claim.

Judge Corley granted Twitter’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint and dismissed it with prejudice because further amendment would be futile.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Zhang v. Twitter Inc. · No. 3:23-cv-00980
Judge
Jacquelyn Corley
Date
Aug. 23, 2023

Background

Taiming Zhang represented himself. He alleged that Twitter permanently suspended his account in November 2021 after he contacted other users and asked them to expose another user’s suspected HIV status. Zhang also alleged that Twitter did not suspend or remove content from that other user’s account after Zhang reported it for possible age-related sexual exploitation and financial scams. He appealed the suspension to Twitter but received no response.

Zhang’s amended complaint sought $11 million and appeared to assert breach of contract, fraud, California Unfair Competition Law claims, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault based on the risk of contracting HIV, defamation, invasion of privacy, and claims under federal criminal statutes concerning sexually explicit material and reporting requirements.

Judicial Notice and Incorporation by Reference

The court considered Twitter’s archived Terms of Service and several publicly available policies, including its abusive-behavior, platform-manipulation, financial-scam, and child-sexual-exploitation policies. The court held that the public webpages were appropriate subjects for judicial notice and that the Terms of Service and policies could also be considered because Zhang’s claims relied on them.

Section 230

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act generally protects interactive computer-service providers from liability when a plaintiff seeks to hold them responsible as the publisher or speaker of information supplied by another person. The protection includes decisions to review, edit, remove, or decline to remove third-party content.

The court held that Twitter qualified as an interactive computer service and that Zhang’s claims concerned Twitter’s decisions to suspend his account, decline to suspend the other user’s account, and respond—or allegedly fail to respond—to user content. The court rejected Zhang’s argument that Twitter became responsible for the other user’s content merely by placing it in social-media feeds. It also rejected the argument that his contract claims avoided Section 230 protection, explaining that the statute contains no exception for contract claims based on protected publishing activity.

The court further held that Section 230 barred Zhang’s civil claims based on 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A, and 2257. Although Section 230 excludes federal criminal prosecutions from its protection, the court stated that this does not create an exception for civil claims based on those criminal statutes.

Failure to State a Claim

The court separately ruled that the amended complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief even if Section 230 did not apply.

For breach of contract, the court held that Twitter’s Terms of Service expressly allowed it to suspend or terminate an account at any time and for any reason. The court also found that Zhang had not plausibly alleged that Twitter’s policies formed contracts requiring Twitter to suspend another user or take a particular enforcement action. In addition, the court noted that Zhang had not alleged actual damages from the claimed contractual breaches.

For fraud, the court found that Zhang had not identified a misrepresentation on which he reasonably relied. His allegations that Twitter’s policies were fraudulent because Twitter did not suspend the other user did not establish fraud.

For intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court held that Zhang had not identified conduct by Twitter beyond its failure to suspend the other user and that the alleged conduct did not plausibly amount to extreme and outrageous conduct. The assault claim also failed because the allegations about a risk of contracting HIV did not show that Twitter intended to cause harmful or offensive contact or that Zhang faced imminent apprehension of such contact.

The defamation claim failed because Zhang did not plausibly allege that Twitter’s statement that his account was suspended for violating Twitter’s rules was false and defamatory. His invasion-of-privacy claim failed because he did not explain its basis or allege an intentional intrusion into a private place, conversation, or matter. The court also noted that he did not respond to Twitter’s arguments against that claim and therefore treated it as abandoned.

The court held that Zhang lacked standing to bring a civil claim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2252A because the statute authorizes a civil claim by a person who was a minor victim of a qualifying violation and suffered personal injury. The court also held that 18 U.S.C. § 2257 does not provide a private right of action.

Finally, the court held that Zhang’s California Unfair Competition Law claim failed because he had not adequately alleged the economic injury required for standing. The court also found that the claim’s legal theory was unclear and that Zhang had not adequately pleaded an unlawful, fraudulent, or unfair business practice.

Disposition

The court granted Twitter’s motion to dismiss Zhang’s amended complaint. It stated that the claims were barred by Section 230 and, independently, failed to state a plausible claim for relief. Because amendment would be futile, the court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The order disposed of Docket No. 40.

The authoritative version

Read the full 13-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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