Gilton v. City and County of San Francisco

Background

Barry Gilton and his children, Ali Gilton, Barry Gilton, Jr., and Laprell Gilton, sued the City and County of San Francisco, Sgt. Damon Jackson, and Officer Reese Burrows under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil-rights statute used to sue state or local officials for constitutional violations. Gilton alleged that the defendants fabricated evidence portraying him as a member of the Central Divisadero Playas gang and maliciously prosecuted him. His claims included fabrication of evidence, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, failure to intervene, and a claim against the City based on municipal policy or practice. His children asserted a claim for loss of familial relations.

Gilton had been tried in federal court in 2020 for murder in aid of racketeering and for participating in a racketeering enterprise. The court granted his motion for judgment of acquittal, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on January 14, 2022. The plaintiffs filed this civil lawsuit on December 6, 2022.

Statute of limitations

The defendants argued that the claims were filed too late. The court explained that § 1983 claims generally use California’s two-year limitations period, but that the accrual date depends on the constitutional right involved. The complaint referred to the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, while counsel clarified at oral argument that the fabrication-of-evidence and malicious-prosecution claims were based on the Fourteenth Amendment.

Assuming, but not deciding, that those claims arose under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court concluded that they accrued when the criminal proceedings ended in Gilton’s favor. Because the Ninth Circuit affirmed the acquittal on January 14, 2022, the court said the lawsuit appeared timely. The court stated that it could revisit the issue after an amended pleading or as the case progressed.

Fabrication of evidence

A fabrication-of-evidence claim requires a plaintiff to identify evidence the government deliberately fabricated and to plausibly allege that the fabrication caused a deprivation of liberty. The plaintiffs identified three alleged forms of fabricated evidence: a CDP organizational chart, a representation that Gilton frequented a known gang hideout at an apartment on Steiner Street, and JB’s testimony that the Giltons were important CDP members.

The court concluded that the allegations were too conclusory to establish causation. The complaint did not adequately explain how the chart caused Gilton’s arrest, prosecution, or detention. The allegations about JB’s testimony suggested that the testimony was given at trial, but did not explain how it caused the earlier arrest or prosecution. The complaint also did not state when or to whom the representation about the Steiner Street apartment was made or how it was used in the case. The fabrication-of-evidence claim was therefore dismissed with leave to amend.

Malicious prosecution

To state a malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant prosecuted him with malice, without probable cause, and for the purpose of denying equal protection or another constitutional right. The court found that the complaint did not adequately allege that Jackson or Burrows caused the federal prosecution. A prosecutor’s decision to file charges is generally presumed to result from the prosecutor’s independent judgment, unless officials improperly pressured the prosecutor, knowingly supplied misinformation, concealed exculpatory evidence, or otherwise acted wrongfully in a way that actively caused the proceedings.

The court held that the complaint did not allege that the defendants presented the identified evidence to a prosecutor or that the evidence actively caused the federal case to begin. It also found that the complaint did not sufficiently overcome the presumption that probable cause existed after the grand jury indicted Gilton. The allegations of fabricated evidence and other wrongful conduct were too general. The malicious-prosecution claim was dismissed with leave to amend. The court did not need to decide whether the complaint adequately alleged malice.

Remaining claims and qualified immunity

The court dismissed the Monell claim against the City, the conspiracy claim, the failure-to-intervene claim, and the children’s loss-of-familial-relations claim with leave to amend. These claims depended on an underlying constitutional violation, and the court found that the complaint had not plausibly alleged one.

The court did not decide whether qualified immunity protected Jackson and Burrows. Qualified immunity can shield government officials from money damages unless the plaintiff plausibly alleges both a constitutional violation and a violation of a clearly established right. The court stated that more facts were needed and that the parties had not adequately addressed the issue.

Disposition

Judge William H. Orrick granted the motion to dismiss with leave to amend within 20 days. The order dismissed all claims in the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend.