Quinonez v. Does 1 through 5

Background

René Quiñonez and Movement Ink LLC asked for permission to amend their Third Amended Complaint again. They sought to add claims under California’s Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, a state law allowing damages when threats, intimidation, or coercion interfere with rights secured by federal or state law. The proposed claims were based on alleged First and Fourth Amendment violations involving the seizure, detention, and search of four packages containing masks screen-printed with political messages.

The United States opposed the request. It argued that the proposed amendments exceeded the limited permission to amend previously granted by the court and would be futile, meaning the claims could not succeed under the governing law. The United States did not argue that the amendments would cause prejudice, undue delay, or bad faith.

The court noted that most of the plaintiffs’ claims had previously been dismissed with prejudice, primarily because the legal theories they used did not provide a cause of action. The court also noted that two claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act remained: a trespass-to-chattels claim based on the alleged search and a claim for interference with prospective economic relations. Those claims were unaffected by this motion.

Court’s reasoning

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 generally favors allowing amendments, but a court may deny leave when an amendment would be futile. The court focused on how the proposed Bane Act claims interacted with the Westfall Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act.

The Westfall Act generally gives federal employees immunity from common-law tort claims arising from acts within the scope of their employment and substitutes the United States as the defendant. The court recognized an exception for civil actions against federal employees brought for constitutional violations. The plaintiffs argued that this exception allowed them to assert state-law Bane Act claims based on alleged constitutional violations.

The court rejected that argument as to the individual federal employees. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Smith, the court held that the Westfall Act’s identified exceptions did not include Bane Act claims. A Bane Act claim is neither a constitutional damages action under Bivens nor an action under a federal statute authorizing recovery against a government employee. The court declined to infer an additional exception.

The court also rejected the proposed claims against the United States. Relying on FDIC v. Meyer and Ninth Circuit authority, it concluded that the Federal Tort Claims Act did not permit Bane Act claims premised on federal constitutional violations. The proposed amendments were therefore futile under the law governing the case.

Disposition

Judge William H. Orrick denied the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to make additional amendments to the Third Amended Complaint. The court’s order addressed the proposed Bane Act amendments and stated that the two existing Federal Tort Claims Act claims against the United States were unaffected.