Geppert v. Doe 1

Background

Rohno Geppert filed a California state-court action against 10 Doe defendants concerning alleged sexual abuse he experienced as a minor. The complaint asserted negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The opinion states that the alleged abuse occurred in approximately 1974, when Geppert was 10 years old, on Church property and during Church-sponsored activities.

The opinion identifies Does 1, 2, and 3 as entities incorporated in Utah that operate and control the Milpitas Ward of the Church. Other Doe defendants were individuals or entities whose identities were not yet known to Geppert. Doe 2 removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction after being served with the amended complaint. Geppert then moved to remand the action to state court. Does 1 and 2 opposed the motion.

The Parties’ Positions

Geppert argued that removal was improper because Doe 3 was a citizen of California and the action had been filed in California. The defendants responded that the removal statute requires courts to disregard the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names.

Geppert also argued that Doe 3 was not truly fictitious, that the defendants knew Doe 3’s identity, and that California law required him to use a Doe designation until he made a required showing concerning his allegations. The court rejected those arguments for purposes of the remand motion, explaining that the federal removal statute requires the citizenship of fictitiously named defendants to be disregarded regardless of whether state law required the Doe designation.

Court’s Analysis

Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. Under the removal statute, a state-court action may be removed when the federal district court would have original jurisdiction. If the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction—the authority to hear the case—it must remand the action to state court.

The court held that Doe 3’s citizenship had to be disregarded because Geppert sued Doe 3 under a fictitious name. The court then concluded that the same rule applied to all 10 Doe defendants. For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, their citizenship therefore had to be treated as providing no state citizenship.

Diversity jurisdiction requires opposing parties to have diverse citizenship. The court concluded that diversity jurisdiction does not exist when one party has citizenship and all opposing parties have no citizenship for purposes of the diversity statute. The court therefore determined that it lacked diversity jurisdiction over the removed action.

Disposition

Judge Susan Van Keulen GRANTED the motion to remand and REMANDED the action to the Superior Court of California for the County of Santa Clara.