Brown v. Schuyler

Background

Gregory L. Brown filed a petition without a lawyer under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal procedure allowing a person in state custody to challenge that custody. On June 3, 2020, the court dismissed the petition because it treated it as a second or repeat petition and Brown had not obtained authorization from the Ninth Circuit to proceed with it.

The court later determined that Brown was not challenging the same conviction and sentence involved in his earlier case. Instead, his claims concerned a state court’s denial of his state petition after finding that amendments to California Penal Code §§ 188 and 189 did not affect his convictions. The court also noted that the claims appeared not to have been presented to California’s appellate and supreme courts when Brown filed the petition in 2020.

The Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissals in this case and another related proceeding. In an opinion filed August 3, 2023, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Brown’s petitions raised claims that were not ready for judicial review when he filed the earlier petitions, and therefore they should not have been dismissed as second or repeat petitions. The Ninth Circuit reversed and sent the matters back to the district court. Its mandate issued on August 25, 2023.

Court’s Action

Because more than three years had passed since the petition was filed, the court left the parties to address whether any exhaustion issues remained. Exhaustion generally means presenting claims through the available state-court review process before seeking federal relief. The court also stated that the petition did not appear meritless based solely on its contents.

The court ordered the clerk to serve the respondent, Charles Schuyler, identified as Acting Warden, and his attorney, the California Attorney General. Within 60 days, Schuyler must file an answer complying with the rules governing federal petitions under § 2254 and provide relevant portions of the state record. The answer must show cause—explain why a federal custody remedy should not issue.

Instead of an answer, Schuyler may file a motion to dismiss on procedural grounds within the same 60-day period. If that occurs, Brown may file an opposition or state that he does not oppose the motion within 60 days after receiving it, and Schuyler may file a reply within 14 days after receiving any opposition. Brown may file a traverse, meaning a response to the answer, within 60 days after receiving the answer.

The order also required Brown to prosecute the case, keep the court and respondent informed of any address change, and serve the respondent’s counsel with communications filed in the case. The court stated that a pro se case may be dismissed without prejudice under the circumstances described in the district’s local rule if court mail is returned as undeliverable and Brown does not provide an updated address within 60 days. The court further stated that extensions may be granted for good cause if requested by the applicable deadline.

Disposition and Significance

Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers issued an order directing the respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted and setting the next procedural steps. The order did not grant or deny the habeas petition, did not resolve any exhaustion issue, and did not decide the underlying claims.