Fleming v. United States of America

Background

Rhonda Fleming, an incarcerated person at Federal Correctional Institution–Dublin, filed this self-represented action concerning alleged medical-care and prison-condition issues. The court’s prior screening order allowed certain claims to proceed, including claims that officials were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs and that one official retaliated against her. The prior order dismissed other claims without prejudice and denied earlier requests for emergency injunctive relief.

This omnibus order addressed seven pending motions: Fleming’s third request for a preliminary injunction and request to expedite that decision; her request for an order under the All Writs Act concerning home confinement and an examination by Dr. Luis Chug; her request to prevent consultation with United States Attorney’s Offices about home confinement; her request to stay any transfer away from FCI-Dublin; her request for service by email; and defendants’ request to be relieved from responding to her motions.

Defendants’ Administrative Motion

Defendants asked to be relieved from responding to Fleming’s repetitive filings until their pending summary-judgment motion was decided. The court found that Fleming’s motions were repetitive and often sought relief previously denied. It GRANTED defendants’ request to be relieved from responding. The court stated that it would issue a separate order if briefing from defendants became necessary.

Preliminary-Injunction Request and Request to Expedite

Fleming sought a preliminary injunction requiring defendants to grant her a medical furlough so that she could be examined and treated by Dr. Luis Chug, a pulmonologist in Houston, Texas. She relied on alleged respiratory symptoms, provisional diagnoses, and alleged exposure to mold and asbestos. Defendants argued, among other things, that Fleming had not exhausted administrative remedies, that a defendant had immunity, and that injunctive relief was unavailable in the type of claim she brought.

The court applied the preliminary-injunction standard, which requires a showing of likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without relief, a favorable balance of hardships, and consistency with the public interest. The court focused on irreparable harm. It noted that FCI-Dublin had arranged for Fleming to see an outside pulmonologist, Dr. Monte Wilson, on March 2, 2023. Dr. Wilson ordered testing to determine treatment, and Fleming acknowledged that Dr. Chug would also need to order testing. The court found no evidence that treatment by Dr. Chug would proceed more quickly and no evidence that Fleming would suffer irreparable harm if she was not treated specifically by him.

The court therefore DENIED Fleming’s request for preliminary injunctive relief requiring treatment by Dr. Chug and a related medical furlough, ECF No. 60. It DENIED as moot her request to expedite the ruling on that motion, ECF No. 70.

Requests Concerning Placement

Fleming’s All Writs Act motion sought an order requiring defendants to promptly review her request for home confinement, barring them from seeking input from the United States Attorney’s Office in the sentencing district, requiring them to report their decision to the court within seven days, and allowing her to see Dr. Chug. Fleming argued that an approval requirement for home confinement violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause.

The court DENIED the All Writs Act motion, ECF No. 63. It found that Fleming had not shown an indisputably clear legal right to home confinement without the asserted approval, had not cited authority establishing that the approval requirement was unconstitutional, and had not demonstrated critical or exigent circumstances. The court also stated that the action before it concerned alleged deliberate indifference to medical needs, not the constitutionality of the home-confinement approval requirement. In addition, the court found no authority allowing it to interfere with the Bureau of Prisons’ review of an individual custody-placement request.

The court DENIED ECF No. 75 because it sought the same relief as ECF No. 63. It also DENIED Fleming’s request in ECF No. 82 to prevent the Bureau of Prisons from transferring her away from FCI-Dublin. The court held that the Bureau of Prisons has authority to determine federal prisoners’ custody placements and that the court could not dictate Fleming’s place of confinement.

Service by Email

Fleming asked defendants to serve her by email because prison mail could be delayed. Defendants responded that the prison email system could not send attachments such as filed papers and exhibits. The court DENIED Fleming’s request for email service, ECF No. 77, explaining that requiring both email and mail would not solve the stated problem. The court noted that Fleming could request more time to respond to defendants’ motion if necessary.

Disposition and Classification

The order terminated ECF Nos. 60, 63, 70, 75, 77, 80, and 82. The order addressed preliminary relief, custody placement, service, and responses to motions; it did not decide the merits of Fleming’s underlying medical-care or prison-condition claims.