Derick M. J. v. Kijakazi

Background

Derick M. J. applied for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, alleging disability beginning January 23, 2017. An administrative law judge found that he was not disabled. The judge recognized several severe impairments, including degenerative disc disease, hearing loss, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, major depressive disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, and polysubstance abuse. The judge nevertheless found that he could perform light work with restrictions and could perform jobs such as electronics worker, shoe packer, and final assembler.

In a prior related proceeding, another judge found harmful error involving the treatment of examining psychologist Dr. Melody Samuelson’s uncontradicted opinion. The case was remanded with instructions requiring the administrative law judge to address moderate limitations involving supervisors and workplace attendance. After further administrative proceedings, a second administrative law judge again found that Derick M. J. was not disabled. He then sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Medical-opinion evidence

Dr. Samuelson examined Derick M. J. and diagnosed bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, a learning disorder, and alcohol and methamphetamine dependence in remission. She identified moderate limitations involving complex and detailed tasks, interaction with the public, supervisors, and coworkers, attention and concentration, workplace attendance, accepting instructions from supervisors, performing work without special or additional supervision, and associating with day-to-day work activity. Two state-agency psychological consultants also found moderate limitations in several related areas.

The administrative law judge gave Dr. Samuelson’s opinion only partial weight. The judge characterized the attendance limitations as speculative and inconsistent with treatment records, found the limitations involving coworkers and supervisors overly restrictive, and relied in part on observations that Derick M. J. was cooperative, arrived on time for an examination, performed simple daily tasks, and had some generally normal mental-status findings.

The court held that these reasons were inadequate. It was unclear whether the administrative law judge rejected the limitation involving attention and concentration or silently included it within the restriction to simple, routine work. The explanation concerning attendance lacked the required specificity, and arriving on time for an examination or requesting a letter about appointment attendance did not adequately address the ability to maintain regular workplace attendance. The court also found that being cooperative with healthcare providers did not show that a person could interact similarly with supervisors and coworkers in a work setting. In addition, the judge did not meaningfully address records describing mood instability, impulse-control problems, distractibility, depression, agitation, anxiety, anger, hostility, and other psychiatric symptoms, or two comprehensive mental-health assessments from 2019 and 2020.

Symptom testimony

The administrative law judge found that Derick M. J.’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably cause his alleged symptoms and identified no evidence of malingering. Under those circumstances, the judge needed specific, clear, and convincing reasons supported by the record to reject testimony about the severity of his symptoms.

The court found that the administrative law judge did not identify specifically which statements were being rejected or explain which evidence contradicted them. The judge also relied on substance abuse even though the decision separately stated that substance abuse was not material to the disability determination. The judge cited Derick M. J.’s efforts to work for a landscaping company, but he testified that he was fired within three months because of conflicts with his supervisor. The court concluded that these reasons did not adequately support discounting his testimony about difficulties with supervisors, concentration, attention, attendance, and punctuality.

Residual functional capacity and remand

Because the medical-opinion and symptom-testimony findings were flawed, the court also found that the resulting residual functional capacity—the most a person can still do despite limitations—and the hypothetical given to the vocational expert were affected. The court did not order immediate benefits. It found that additional issues remained to be resolved and that it was not clear that crediting Dr. Samuelson’s opinion and Derick M. J.’s testimony would necessarily establish disability.

Judge Alex G. Tse granted Derick M. J.’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with the order.