Khan v. Twitter, Inc.

Background

Abdul Kareem Khan filed the case without a lawyer and asked to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. After an earlier screening order dismissed the original complaint with leave to amend, the court gave Khan another opportunity to correct the identified deficiencies. He filed an amended complaint against Twitter, Inc.

Khan alleged that, beginning around August 2020, he received daily email notifications about tweets or retweets from an anonymous account called “Emma Watson Updates.” He said he could not find a way to limit the notifications, that Twitter did not respond to notices he sent, and that Twitter later sent additional notifications. He attributed emotional distress, sleep deprivation, health problems, lost work and savings, reduced productivity, and other injuries to Twitter’s conduct. He sought $15 million.

The amended complaint asserted claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, violations of 15 U.S.C. § 6801, Section 2 of the Sherman Act, California Business and Professions Code § 17200, and 15 U.S.C. §§ 45 and 52. It also sought compensation under 15 U.S.C. § 15.

Court’s analysis

Because Khan was proceeding without prepaying the filing fee, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) required the court to dismiss the case if the complaint was frivolous, failed to state a claim, or sought money from an immune defendant. The court applied the requirement that a complaint contain enough facts to present a plausible claim for relief and construed Khan’s self-represented allegations liberally.

For intentional infliction of emotional distress under California law, the court held that the alleged email notifications were frustrating but did not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct. The court also found no indication that Twitter intended to cause severe emotional distress or knew that the notifications would do so. It further found that Khan had not adequately alleged causation because he said he sometimes deleted or did not read the notifications and did not explain how they caused the severe distress alleged.

For breach of contract, the court accepted that Khan had identified the 2018 Twitter User Agreement but found no provision that Twitter breached. The provisions Khan cited primarily restricted users’ conduct, and the agreement stated that Twitter might not monitor or control posted content and that users could deactivate their accounts.

The court held that 15 U.S.C. § 6801, concerning safeguards for customers’ nonpublic personal information held by financial institutions, did not apply because Twitter was not a financial institution as described in 15 U.S.C. § 6805. It held that the Sherman Act claims did not fit the alleged facts because Khan did not allege monopolization, an agreement restraining trade, or injury to business or property from conduct forbidden by the antitrust laws.

As to California Business and Professions Code § 17200, the court held that Khan sought individual personal and economic damages, which are not recoverable under that provision. The court therefore did not reach whether the alleged facts stated a plausible claim under that statute. Finally, the court held that the cited provisions of 15 U.S.C. §§ 45 and 52 did not apply because Khan did not allege that the notifications affected commerce or that he received qualifying false advertisements through United States mail.

Disposition

Judge Susan Illston concluded that the complaint failed to state a claim and that its deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. The court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. The opinion does not state that the court awarded damages to either party.