In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation

Background

This consolidated internet-privacy litigation was brought by Paloma Gaos, Anthony Italiano, and Gabriel Priyev against Google, LLC. The plaintiffs alleged that Google disclosed users’ private personal information to third parties. The court had previously approved an $8.5 million settlement, but appeals led to a Supreme Court remand for analysis of the plaintiffs’ standing, meaning their legal ability to bring the claims. On remand, the court found that the plaintiffs had standing for their federal claims and had sufficiently alleged standing for previously dismissed state-law claims.

The parties later negotiated a new settlement. In May 2023, the court preliminarily approved a $23 million settlement, conditionally certified a settlement class, and appointed class counsel and representatives. The class covered people in the United States who submitted a search query to Google and clicked on a search result between October 25, 2006, and September 30, 2013. Google agreed to pay the settlement fund without admitting liability. The agreement provided for payments to participating class members on an equal pro rata basis, certain website disclosures about how search terms could be disclosed through a referrer header, and a release of claims against Google. It provided that leftover money would generally be distributed to claimants and, if distribution costs exceeded the remaining balance, paid to a residual recipient selected by mutual agreement of the parties.

Notice, Objections, and Settlement Fairness

The settlement administrator used internet advertising, search advertising, Gmail advertising, social media, class-action websites, nationally circulated print magazines, a settlement website, and a toll-free telephone number. The notice program reached 83% of potential class members. Of an estimated 193 million class members, 2,530 timely opted out and 2,564,682 claims were submitted. Two people submitted written objections: Clifford Weiler and Boyd John Adams. The court overruled both objections. It found the notice adequate, the settlement class appropriate for settlement purposes, and the settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate under the factors governing class-action settlements. The court also found no evidence of conflicts of interest or collusion.

Fees, Costs, and Service Awards

The court granted class counsel’s request for $5,750,000 in attorneys’ fees, equal to 25% of the settlement fund, and $43,634.69 in litigation costs. The court used the percentage-of-the-fund method and cross-checked the result using the lodestar method, which multiplies reasonable hours by reasonable hourly rates. Class counsel reported a lodestar of $3,107,295.25 for 4,014.4 hours and applied a 1.85 multiplier. The court found the requested fee and costs reasonable in light of the litigation’s length, risks, complexity, and results.

The court also approved $5,000 incentive awards for each named plaintiff—Gaos, Italiano, and Priyev—based on their efforts and the litigation’s thirteen-year duration. It granted former objectors Melissa Holyoak and Theodore H. Frank’s request for $793,500 in attorneys’ fees. The court concluded that their litigation and appeals ultimately led to a substantial increased benefit for the settlement class, although it noted that the connection between their appeals and the increased fund was debatable. Their requested fee represented 4.6% of the settlement fund, and the court found it reasonable after a lodestar cross-check.

Disposition

Judge Edward J. Davila granted the motion for final approval of the class-action settlement. The court also granted plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs and granted former objectors’ motion for attorneys’ fees. It confirmed the provisional appointments of the class representatives and class counsel, approved the specified fee, cost, and incentive awards, directed the clerk to close the file upon entry of judgment, and retained jurisdiction over matters involving interpretation, administration, implementation, effectuation, and enforcement of the order and settlement.