McGee v. Milpitas Police Department

Background

Anthony McGee, who represented himself, sued the City of Milpitas and the Milpitas Police Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows claims for violations of federal constitutional rights by a person acting under state law. He alleged that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment by searching him and his car without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and by arresting him without probable cause.

According to the amended complaint, on March 6, 2023, an officer approached McGee at a gas station, asked whether he was on searchable probation, and then searched his car. The officer arrested McGee for allegedly failing to register as a sex offender after checking information in a law-enforcement system. McGee told the officer that he was not a sex offender and was already addressing what he said was an incorrect accusation. McGee was booked, bail was set at $25,000, and he was later released after his spouse posted bail. He sought $300 million in damages.

McGee had previously amended his complaint after the court found that his original complaint failed to state a claim. He did not oppose the defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

Court’s Analysis

The court first granted the defendants’ request to take judicial notice of documents from McGee’s federal criminal case and a Santa Clara County criminal case, but only to the extent the documents were necessary to decide the motion. The court did not take judicial notice of disputed facts in those records.

Municipal liability

The court held that McGee failed to plead a claim against the City or the Police Department under the rule commonly called Monell. A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation, but it is not automatically liable for an employee’s alleged misconduct merely because the employee works for it.

The amended complaint added facts about the arresting officer but did not allege that the officer acted under an unlawful city policy, practice, or custom. The court treated McGee’s allegation that the City Attorney “condone[d] and support[ed]” the officer’s conduct as an attempted claim that the city ratified the conduct. The court found that the City Attorney’s failure to accept McGee’s pre-litigation demands did not show that the City Attorney was a final policymaker who ratified an unconstitutional act. The court also found that the deficiency could not be cured by adding more facts.

Searches and arrest

The court also considered whether McGee could amend his complaint to sue the arresting officer, whom he had not named as a defendant. It concluded that amendment would be futile.

As to the searches, the court said officers do not need reasonable suspicion or another legal basis merely to check criminal or traffic records. The court also relied on McGee’s federal supervised-release condition, which required him to submit his person, property, residence, vehicle, and controlled property to searches by federal, state, or local law-enforcement officers at any time, with or without suspicion. Although that condition did not automatically make every search constitutional, the court concluded that McGee could not state a viable claim because the alleged search followed a records check indicating that he violated a sex-offender-registration requirement and was not alleged to have been conducted merely to harass him.

As to the arrest, the court explained that probable cause exists when the known facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that the suspect committed a crime. The amended complaint said the officer relied on records indicating that McGee was subject to sex-offender-registration requirements and had failed to comply with them. Although McGee disputed that he was required to register, he did not dispute that the officer relied on those records. The court therefore concluded that probable cause for the arrest was apparent from the allegations.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ unopposed motion to dismiss. It dismissed McGee’s Fourth Amendment claim against the City and the Milpitas Police Department for failure to state a claim and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice because it was “absolutely clear” that amendment would be futile. The court directed the clerk to close the file.