Hubbard v. Google LLC
- Susan Van Keulen
- 5:19-cv-07016
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 6
In Hubbard v. Google LLC, Judge Freeman granted plaintiffs leave to file a fourth amended complaint and terminated defendants’ pending dismissal motion without prejudice.
The plaintiffs may file a fourth amended complaint, while the defendants may later file a new motion to dismiss that complaint. The order did not decide the merits of the plaintiffs’ privacy claims.
What happened
In Hubbard v. Google LLC, children’s privacy plaintiffs alleged that Google and owners of several YouTube channels collected personal information from children under 13 without parental consent. Earlier, the district court dismissed their state-law claims as preempted by the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and sent the case back.
The plaintiffs asked to file a fourth amended complaint that would remove unnecessary allegations, add support for requested remedies, and add plaintiffs and claims involving 14 states. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had waited too long and had given up their right to amend by accepting judgment and appealing. The court found no sufficient delay, bad faith, repeated failure to fix problems, unfair prejudice, or futility, and rejected the waiver argument.
Judge Beth Labson Freeman granted the motion. The plaintiffs were ordered to file the fourth amended complaint within three days, and the defendants’ pending motion to dismiss was terminated without prejudice to filing a new dismissal motion against the amended complaint.
The detailed version
- Hubbard v. Google LLC · No. 5:19-cv-07016
- Susan Van Keulen
- Nov. 13, 2023
Background
The plaintiffs alleged that Google LLC and owners of several YouTube channels violated children’s privacy rights by collecting personal data from children under 13 without parental consent when they used YouTube. The initial complaint asserted California-law claims. Later complaints added plaintiffs from several states and claims under additional state laws.
The district court previously dismissed the second and third amended complaints after concluding that the state-law claims were expressly preempted—meaning displaced by—a federal law, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act. The court allowed amendment in the earlier proceedings, but the plaintiffs eventually declined to file another amended complaint, and the court entered judgment. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the preemption provision did not bar state-law claims parallel to, or prohibiting the same conduct as, the federal law. The case was returned to the district court to consider other dismissal arguments that had been preserved.
Motion to Amend
The plaintiffs sought permission under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 to file a fourth amended complaint. The proposed pleading would remove allegations of deception that the plaintiffs said were no longer necessary after the appellate decision, add allegations supporting injunctive and equitable relief, and add plaintiffs and claims concerning 14 states.
The defendants opposed amendment. They argued that the plaintiffs had unduly delayed because they could have added the new plaintiffs and claims nearly three years earlier, and that the plaintiffs had waived—given up—the right to seek further amendment by choosing to accept judgment and appeal instead of amending after the third amended complaint was dismissed.
Court’s Analysis
Rule 15 generally requires courts to allow amendment when justice requires. Courts commonly consider factors including undue delay, bad faith, repeated failure to correct earlier defects, unfair prejudice to the opposing party, and whether the proposed amendment would be futile, meaning unable to support a viable claim.
The court concluded that none of these factors justified denying leave. The plaintiffs filed the motion two months after the appellate mandate issued, and any earlier delay by itself was insufficient. The court found no bad faith or repeated failure to correct deficiencies. It also found no undue prejudice because the proposed complaint retained the same causes of action and substantive allegations as the initial complaint while removing unnecessary allegations, adding evidence, and adding parties and state-law claims based on the same underlying allegations. The court likewise found that the defendants had not shown that the amendment would be futile.
The court rejected the defendants’ waiver argument. It explained that the appellate decisions cited by the defendants involved different circumstances, including attempts to amend after losing on appeal or efforts to amend pleadings that the appellate court had already considered. Here, the appellate court had addressed only preemption, and the merits of the claims had not yet been considered. The court also stated that a district court may allow amendment after an appeal unless the appellate mandate expressly prevents it.
Order
The court GRANTED the plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Further Amended Complaint. It ordered the plaintiffs to file the fourth amended complaint within three days of the order. The court also TERMINATED the defendants’ pending Motion to Dismiss without prejudice to the defendants filing a motion to dismiss the fourth amended complaint.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.