Bell v. Lee

Background

Vincent Keith Bell alleges that San Francisco Sheriff’s Department officers and Lieutenant Christopher Krol beat him on August 13, 2013, while he was returning to his cell in a wheelchair. Bell alleges that he has one leg amputated, yet officers forced him to hop on his remaining leg for roughly 100 feet to a safety cell and dragged him along the way. He alleges that officers beat him again inside the safety cell.

The case originally proceeded against individual officers. The remaining individual-officer claim is for excessive force. Bell later amended his complaint to add the City and County of San Francisco and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging municipal liability. A municipal-liability claim, often called a Monell claim, seeks to hold a local government responsible when an official policy, custom, failure to train, or decision by a final policymaker causes a constitutional violation. The operative complaint was Bell’s third amended complaint.

The City’s motion

The City moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not adequately state a claim for relief. The City argued that Bell’s municipal-liability claim was untimely, did not state a viable claim, and was barred by judicial estoppel. The City also asked the court to strike certain allegations and, alternatively, require Bell to provide a more definite statement.

Statute of limitations

The court had previously declined to dismiss the municipal-liability claim as untimely because the factual record was not sufficiently developed. The City renewed that argument after discovering that Bell had tried in 2013 to add allegations about retaliation to a different case. The court concluded that this new information did not change its earlier analysis. Although the court expressed serious concerns about whether the municipal-liability claim was timely, it again DENIED the City’s motion to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds, without prejudice to renewal at summary judgment.

Policy-or-custom theory

Bell alleged that the City had a policy or custom of misusing safety cells, including for disciplinary and retaliatory purposes. The court found these allegations inadequate. It explained that isolated acts by a non-policymaking employee generally do not establish a municipal policy or custom. Bell relied primarily on his 2013 placement in a safety cell and another person’s 2018 placement, which was involved in an earlier related proceeding. The court found that two incidents more than four years apart were insufficient to show a persistent and widespread practice.

The court therefore GRANTED the City’s motion to dismiss the policy-or-custom theory, with prejudice.

Failure-to-train theory

Bell alleged that the City failed to train staff to move people with disabilities to safety cells using wheelchairs or gurneys. He also relied on testimony from a City deputy who worked in the training unit and reportedly testified that sworn staff were not specifically trained on that subject.

The court held that Bell had adequately alleged a failure-to-train theory at the pleading stage. Although a pattern of similar constitutional violations is ordinarily needed, the court explained that a claim may proceed without such a pattern when a constitutional violation could be a highly predictable result of failing to provide training for a recurring situation. Bell’s allegations that officers forced him to hop on one leg and dragged him to the safety cell, together with the alleged lack of training, were sufficient at this stage.

The court therefore DENIED the City’s motion to dismiss the failure-to-train theory.

Ratification theory

Bell alleged that Lieutenant Krol and supervisors in the Department of Public Health approved the alleged policy of misusing safety cells and improperly transporting people to them. The court found the allegations insufficient. Bell did not provide facts showing that Krol had final authority to establish municipal policy concerning safety-cell placement. The court also found that Bell’s allegations about Department of Public Health supervisors did not show approval of his own placement, because Bell alleged that a staff psychiatrist released him after concluding that he should not have been in the safety cell.

The court therefore GRANTED the City’s motion to dismiss the ratification theory, with prejudice.

More definite statement and striking allegations

The court found that a more definite statement was unnecessary and would cause further delay. It stated that the claims remaining were the excessive-force claim against Lieutenant Krol and Officers De Los Reyes, Gatman, Herron, and Lee, and the municipal-liability claim based on failure to train.

The court STRUCK specified allegations in the third amended complaint concerning retaliation and disciplinary due-process claims because those claims had not survived an earlier summary-judgment ruling. The court also DENIED the City’s request for judicial notice of the twelve documents attached to its motion, as reflected in the opinion.

Discovery dispute

The court declined to order the City to provide testimony on Topic 3 of Bell’s notice for a deposition of a City organizational representative because it was overly broad. The court found Topic 6 relevant and appropriately limited to the remaining failure-to-train issue, and ORDERED the City to provide testimony on that topic. The court encouraged the parties to discuss a protective order if the topic raised privacy concerns involving other inmates.

Disposition

Judge Susan Illston’s order GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART the City’s motion to dismiss. It dismissed the policy-or-custom and ratification theories with prejudice, allowed the failure-to-train theory to proceed, denied the limitations challenge without prejudice to renewal at summary judgment, struck specified allegations, and entered the stated discovery ruling.