Estavillo v. Cortese

Background

Erik Estavillo sued Dave Cortese and Country Club Villa Apartments under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. According to the complaint, Estavillo lived at the apartments with his parents and has Crohn’s disease, depression, obsessive compulsive disorder, and panic disorder. After buying a vehicle, he requested a parking sticker so he could park near his home. He alleges that apartment personnel told him that the property’s two-vehicle limit prevented him from receiving another sticker and directed him to park in the visitor area or at a nearby Bank of America.

Estavillo alleges that he later received parking tickets and warnings that his vehicle would be towed, even though it displayed a disabled placard. He also alleges that other vehicles were not ticketed, that a security supervisor said his disabled status did not matter, and that a property manager did not respond to his written request for an additional sticker or an exception. He further alleges that the property manager later restricted his access to the main office and required his father to speak for him about his vehicle and apartment.

Estavillo had previously filed a lawsuit against Cortese and the Apartments in Santa Clara County Superior Court. He later filed a nearly identical federal complaint, identifying the federal claim as arising under Title III of the ADA. The state-court complaint referred to the ADA and sought damages, a declaration, an injunction, and costs, but it also referred to state law. The court stated that Estavillo did not identify the particular state statute or statutes supporting his state-law claim.

Defendants’ Motion

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court interpreted the defendants’ argument that the complaint did not support “subject matter jurisdiction” as an argument that the complaint failed to state a federal claim, and treated the motion as one under Rule 12(b)(6).

The defendants’ main argument was claim-splitting. Claim-splitting generally prevents a party from bringing claims based on the same facts in successive actions instead of bringing them together. The defendants argued that the state and federal actions involved the same claims. Estavillo disputed that characterization, explaining that he intended to assert an ADA claim in federal court and state-law claims in state court.

Court’s Analysis

The court declined to dismiss on claim-splitting grounds. Although the two actions appeared to rely on the same underlying facts and involved the same defendants, the defendants did not cite authority showing that claim-splitting applied when parallel actions asserting different claims were proceeding in different courts. The court also cited authority stating that overlapping or even identical federal and state litigation may proceed simultaneously, subject to abstention and comity doctrines. The defendants had not asked the court to dismiss or stay the federal case on those grounds.

For an ADA Title III discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege that he is disabled under the ADA, that the defendant is a private entity owning, leasing, or operating a place of public accommodation, and that the defendant denied him public accommodations because of his disability. ADA discrimination can include failing to make reasonable modifications to policies, practices, or procedures when necessary to provide accommodations to people with disabilities.

The court noted that Estavillo’s complaint contained allegations about state-court jurisdiction and venue that did not apply to the federal case. It also noted that private plaintiffs cannot obtain money damages under Title III of the ADA. However, the defendants did not argue that the complaint lacked sufficient facts to support an ADA Title III claim, apart from their unsuccessful claim-splitting argument. The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

Disposition

The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. It granted the defendants’ request to take judicial notice of Estavillo’s state-court complaint but did not take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in that pleading. The court disregarded Estavillo’s improperly filed sur-reply. The court expressed no opinion on whether Estavillo should or must maintain a separate state-court action concerning his California Unruh Act claim.